

NOV 20 1948

The CLASSICAL QUARTERLY and CLASSICAL REVIEW are the organs of the Classical Association. For the present the QUARTERLY will be published in two DOUBLE numbers in April and October; the times of publication of the REVIEW are variable under prevailing conditions.

# The Classical Review

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Volume LXII

SEPTEMBER 1948

Number 2

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OXFORD : AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

LONDON, NEW YORK, TORONTO, AND MELBOURNE : GEOFFREY CUMBERLEGE

Price 5s. net. Yearly subscription, 16s. net, post free; U.S.A., \$3.40. Combined yearly subscription for the CLASSICAL QUARTERLY and the CLASSICAL REVIEW, 30s. net, post free; U.S.A., \$6.30

Entered as Second Class at the New York, U.S.A., Post Office.

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# THE CLASSICAL REVIEW

SEPTEMBER 1948

## NOTES AND NEWS

THE Forty-fourth General Meeting of the Classical Association was held at Sheffield from 31 March to 3 April. Numbers were somewhat smaller than usual, and it is possible that some members were intimidated by the prospect of spending three days in a grim industrial town. But those who ventured were well rewarded. Admirable arrangements had been made by the local Branch for the comfort and convenience of the visitors, and the whole meeting was full of interest. On the first evening there was a reception at the University by the Vice-Chancellor (Dr. J. I. O. Masson), and on the following day the Association was welcomed and hospitably entertained at the Town Hall by the Lord Mayor and Lady Mayoress.

The presidential Address on 'The Cleverness of the Greeks' was given by Professor F. E. Adcock. During the course of the meeting papers were read by Mr. D. M. Jones on 'Popular Ideas of History in Fifth- and Fourth-Century Athens'; by Professor J. Tate on 'Greek Views of Inspiration'; by Emeritus Professor E. S. Forster on 'Columella: the Man and his Work'; by Professor T. A. Sinclair on 'Thucydides as a Political Thinker'; and by Mr. E. A. Thompson on 'The Empire of Attila'. Last year's experiment, 'Communications', was repeated in a more spacious form, and contributions by Professor J. D. Craig on 'Is the Roman Tradition a Myth?', by Mr. A. C. Moorhouse on 'The Etymology of *περιτορπία*', and by Mr. T. J. Cadoux on 'Crassus', aroused interesting discussions.

Three excursions had been arranged, to suit all tastes. One party visited the Library and Art Collection of Chatsworth House; another explored Peveril Castle and the Peak Cavern; the third made an archaeological trip to Rotherham. All these excursions had been carefully planned, and members were brought back in good time for what

proved to be one of the most memorable parts of the programme, a performance in Latin, by members of the Sheffield Branch, of the *Miles Gloriosus*. The players acquitted themselves admirably, and the audience could scarcely have been more responsive; for two hours the humour of Plautus lived again.

At the Annual Business Meeting Lord Soulbury was elected President for 1949, and it was announced that the Association had been invited to meet at Manchester next year. This meeting was followed by a discussion on the Report of the Secondary Schools Examination Council, under the chairmanship of Professor G. H. Turnbull, Professor of Education in the University of Sheffield.

This General Meeting, the first to be held at Sheffield since 1913, will be remembered by those who were present as a particularly happy and successful occasion.

We learn that publication of the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* is to be resumed. Work continued on it throughout the war and all the materials survived without loss. The Swiss scholar Dr. Heinz Haffter has now been appointed general editor; the home of the *Thesaurus* is at the Bavarian monastery of Scheyern, but it is intended that it should return to Munich. Between 1939 and 1943, when printing was interrupted, several parts had appeared: vol. v. 2 had reached *expavesco* (fasc. 10) and vol. vii. 1 *induviae* (fasc. 8). The publishers hope to reprint these parts. The rest of these two volumes, with vol. viii beyond *membrum*, is now ready for printing; v. 2. 11 (*expavesco-expono*) will be the first part to appear. With the publication of the remaining four instalments of E, half of the whole work (A-H) will be finished.

We understand that Unesco is making itself responsible for the future of

*L'Année Philologique*, that invaluable tool of the classical scholar. That its international usefulness should be thus recognized is welcome, but there is a less happy side to the picture. Having made it a principle that what appears under its auspices should appear both in English and in French, Unesco insists on applying this rule to *L'Année Philologique* and requires the production of two editions, with the brief summaries written in French and in English respectively. Nothing could be more unreasonable. No doubt the translation will be done as admirably as the editing, but who wants it done at all? The only civilized countries in which French is not as familiar as English, or more familiar, are those of the British Commonwealth and the United States; do those who direct Unesco think that British and American classical scholars cannot read simple French? If they do, we hope that they will consider both the credit and the convenience of English-speaking scholars and change their view. We want to have our *L'Année Philologique* appearing with the least possible delay; to waste time and effort, not to speak of money, on turning it into our vernacular is inexcusable.

In vol. x, fasc. 4 (Oct. 1947) of *Dioniso*, the quarterly journal of the Istituto Nazionale del Dramma Antico at Syracuse, there is a valuable series of notes on the theatres of Magna Graecia by B. Pace, leading to a discussion of the history of the classical theatre as illustrated by them. Pace rightly notes that there were two ways of giving spectators a good view of the actors of a play, the Greek way of providing raised seats lining a *κοῖλον*, and

the Italian (illustrated by phlyakic vases, etc.) of mounting the actors (particularly comic actors) on a platform, while the spectators remained on level ground. The Hellenistic theatre with its raised stage combined the two, and Pace suggests that in this the builders were copying earlier Western models, such as the theatre of Syracuse with its movable 'phlyakic' stage, and giving a double structure which he refers to the time of Epicharmus and Aeschylus. There is much that is open to criticism here, but the article contains suggestions which are worth following up, and the latter part of it traces, so far as is possible, the ways in which the Italian theatres, in their turn, adopted the Greek *κοῖλον*. The number includes also a review of Anti's *Teatri Greci Arcaici* by P. E. Arias—perhaps too uncritical, though the reviewer himself is sceptical in regard to Anti's theory of the history of the Athenian theatre. Another article of real value is a study by L. Massa Positano of the text of Aeschylus as edited by Triclinius; and G. Pagani contributes a long discussion of the character of Chrysothemis in Sophocles.

We welcome the revived *Philologus*. Volume 97, of which two parts have appeared this year and will be summarized in the next number of *C.R.*, maintains the standards of editing and printing of earlier years. An anastatic reprint of Volume 96 (two double numbers), the stocks of which were destroyed, is being prepared, and those who wish to obtain it are asked to inform the publishers, Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Spiegelgasse 9, Wiesbaden.

### EURIPIDES' *ALCESTIS*

THE following notes do not pretend to be a complete treatment of the *Alkestis*. They have the limited aim of stressing certain features of dramatic importance in the composition of the play.

#### 1. *The Fairy-tale Element*

The plot of the *Alkestis* is recognized as being in origin a fairy-tale rather than

a heroic tale, one of the many variants on the theme of the cheating of Death by human cleverness, piety, or love. In the fairy-tale two worlds on different levels are brought into contact with each other. When such a tale is told in its primitive and relatively unsophisticated form, there is no difficulty in presenting this contact; Charos meets the young

man and wrestles with him, the *Καλή Μοῖρα* comes from behind the hearth to bless the family. But no such happy result could have occurred in Euripides' play when Alcestis *στᾶσα πρόσθεν ἑστίας προσήξατο* (162).<sup>1</sup> Euripides chose to develop the human side of the story. The fairy-tale element could not be allowed to dominate and determine the sequence of human action and emotion of which Euripides wished to make the plot of his play. To reconcile the two worlds of the story so as to prevent the non-human element from awkwardly intruding into the human tale and making it absurd was the delicate task he had to accomplish; and the result shows, not that the fairy-tale element was an inconvenience to him, but that it was something which properly used could enhance the value of the play, just as misapplied it could have ruined it.

At the outset Euripides was helped in reconciling the two elements of the story by the local setting of the tale itself, and he shows the artist's characteristic skill in turning to account possibilities offered by the material. Thessaly was a land associated with magic, and Euripides keeps the Thessalian setting before our eyes. In 425-31 we are reminded of the Thessalian horses and of the magnificence of the courts kept by the Thessalian princes. In 588-96 the Chorus sings of the sheep-rearing Thessalian plains, with Lake Boebe and the surrounding wooded hills. In their first encounter with Heracles (476-80) the men of Pherae speak of their *ἄστυ*, which to the visitor from the *πόλις*-regions of southern Greece had seemed more to deserve the name of *κώμη*. Admetus himself is represented in important characteristics as typically Thessalian: he is a great landowner and stock-raiser and has the Thessalian pride in hospitality,<sup>2</sup> while Pheres' first answer to his son's insulting language is

that he is a Thessalian and sprung from a Thessalian (677-8). Thessaly was a country in which wonders were in place, and it serves Euripides as Tibet or Ireland might serve a modern writer who wished to make use of a 'supernatural' element in his story.<sup>3</sup>

In the structure of the play the two worlds are reconciled by being to some extent kept apart, by the fact that their points of contact are limited. Before seeing how this is done, we must note that in order to support the fairy-tale element, that is, the saving of Admetus by Alcestis and of Alcestis by Heracles, Euripides has used the common device of introducing parallel myths. Thus, within the bounds assigned to it, the value and significance of this element of the story are increased. The myth of Apollo as hired labourer (1 ff., 569 ff.) gives a kind of historical setting to the story and develops the theme of Admetus' piety and hospitality. The theme of the cheating of Death is supported by the myths of Asclepius' raising of the dead (3-4, 122 ff., 969-72) and of the saving of Admetus by Apollo (9-14, 32-3, etc.). Further, these myths are not merely parallels to the saving of Alcestis by Heracles but are stages in the chain of events leading to it. A similar pair of supporting myths are those which have the theme of 'love stronger than death'—the stories of Orpheus (357-9)<sup>4</sup> and of Protesilaus; the latter Euripides could not use directly, since in the chronology of the heroic age it came after the story of Admetus, but he cleverly alludes to it by making Admetus say that he will cherish an image of his dead wife (348 ff.).<sup>5</sup>

The fairy-tale element provides the material for the prologue, including the dialogue between Apollo and Death. Death is here no allegorical or philosophical figure, but the character of

<sup>1</sup> I assume that the *δέσποινα* of 163 is Hecate; cf. *Med.* 397. For the *Καλή Μοῖρα* see Pernot, *Recueil de textes en grec usuel*, pp. 66 and 74: *ἀξάφῃ ἀνολγεί ἡ γυνὴ τοῦ σπιτιοῦ καὶ βγαίνει ἡ Καλή Μοῖρα*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Xen. Hell.* vi. 1. 3 on Polydamas of Pharsalia: *ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως φιλόξενός τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τὸν Θεσσαλικὸν τρόπον*.

<sup>3</sup> This insistence on the Thessalian setting is well brought out by Weber in the introduction to his edition of the *Alcestis*.

<sup>4</sup> In 966-8 the reference is, as Professor T. B. L. Webster has kindly pointed out to me, to Orphism rather than to the legend of Orpheus.

<sup>5</sup> The tales of Orpheus, Alcestis, and Protesilaus are similarly connected by Lucian, *Dial. Mort.* 23. 3.

folk-lore who lays hands on those whose life is forfeit and carries them off, like the Charos who

*ἀέρει τοὺς νεοὺς ἀπὸ μυστρά, τοὺς γέροντες κατόπι.*

The prologue introduces all the supporting myths except those of Orpheus and Protesilaus, which are, as will be seen, specially relevant to Admetus, and therefore come in his farewell speech to his wife. The myths then disappear from the iambics, but are recalled in lyric passages (cited above); the figure of Death, together with that of Charon, returns in the delirious vision of Alcestis (252-6, 259-63),<sup>1</sup> which thus provides a kind of modulation from one plane to the other. On the human level her vision can be satisfactorily accounted for as due to delirium, as, indeed, her quick return to sanity indicates; she dies 'in the full possession of her faculties'. But remembering the prologue the audience is justified in feeling an added thrill as though at the presence of an unseen and supernatural power. To the two worlds of the story, then, are assigned the different levels which the structure of a Greek play makes available—to the fairy-tale world the prologue and the lyrics, together with the hallucination of a mind at the point of death, and to the development of the human story the iambic dialogue and some of the lyric passages.

In what manner do the two worlds influence one another? To the undeveloped fairy-story both are equally necessary and on equal terms. This treatment of the story is, in the *Alcestis*, mainly reserved for those parts of the play assigned, as we have seen, to the folk-tale element. In the human part of the story everything has human motives and takes a human course, so that we might almost speak of a 'predetermined

<sup>1</sup> As the MSS. stand, Alcestis calls the figure she sees Ἄιδας. Since the carrying-off of the dead seems in this play to be the function of Death (47, 49, 73-6, and 870-1 suggest the duty of Θάνατος and his relation to Ἄιδης), the conjecture δ δα is tempting. Perhaps too great exactitude should not be demanded in an hallucination. Ἄιδας and Charon are again mentioned together in 438-41. By 268 Alcestis has come to herself, and the Ἄιδας of that line is merely the common poetical equivalent for Θάνατος.

harmony'. The arrival of Heracles and the saving of Alcestis are foretold by Apollo to Death (64-9). But when in the course of the play Heracles does arrive he gives for his coming a humanly sufficient reason which has nothing to do with the happenings at Pherae, and it is by accident that he learns of Alcestis' death. This use of accident has offended some critics, and it has been suggested that the manner in which Heracles learns of the death of Alcestis is due to an oversight on Euripides' part. Euripides, however, like many other writers, knew that accident as well as character has its place in a human story, and further, in the *Alcestis* the accidents, as they seem from the human level, are provided for, or at least foreseen, on the supernatural.

One event on the fairy-tale level could not be treated as supporting myth—the saving of Alcestis. A messenger-speech describing the events at the tomb would have ruined the balance between the two elements which the rest of the play establishes. Euripides saves it by taking advantage of the dual character of Heracles. In his intercourse with mortals he is shown in what we may call his human-heroic character, speaking in a strangely matter-of-fact way even of his labours (e.g. 481, 483). In the same tone he mentions to Admetus his fight with Death. To secure this aspect of his character Euripides imparts to it a discreet admixture of the Heracles burlesqued in comedy. But in the speech where he announces his intention to save Alcestis (837-60), while the stage is empty of merely human characters, it is the divine-heroic side of his character which is prominent. Euripides thus reduces mention of the fight with Death to three lines in the human context, and dwells on it only when the absence of the Chorus and the human characters permits a second 'modulation' by means of the person of Heracles to the non-human level.

## 2. The Enlightening of Admetus

In the composition of the *Alcestis* Euripides has made constant use of a device by which words, expressions, and



ideas are first given prominence and are then introduced at a later stage of the action in a different and often more significant context. The examples of this technique, though the same in principle, vary in their working out, so that they produce no effect of monotony. This may best be illustrated by an examination of the means by which the attitude of Admetus is changed in the course of the play, and of the nature or content of that change.

The play in its human aspect presents a change of attitude, or an increase of enlightenment, in Admetus as the result of a series of emotional shocks. The death of Alcestis, with her farewell speech and the lamentation of the child, and the quarrel with Pheres are obviously to be regarded as shocks of this kind. The deception which Admetus is led to practise on Heracles is another. The serving-woman's paradox *καὶ ζῶσαν εἰπεῖν καὶ θανοῦσαν ἔστι σοι* (141), which from her had seemed pointless, even irritating, now reappears with horrible significance on the lips of Admetus (519 ff.): *διπλοῦς ἐπ' αὐτῇ μῦθος ἔστι μοι λέγειν . . . ἔστιν τε κοῦκέτ' ἔστιν, ἀλγύνει δέ με*. Each of these shocks produces no immediate outward change in Admetus, but is reflected at a later stage in the vocabulary of his utterances. Thus the bitterest moment of the deception of Heracles (532-3) is shown to have left its mark on Admetus' mind by the *γυναικ' ὀθνεῖαν* of 646; the words first used to mislead Heracles are now used in an attempt to shame Pheres. In the speech in which he attacks his father Admetus not only uses ideas expressed by his wife in her last speech to him, but also introduces, even in different contexts, a number of words which come in a cluster in the speech of Alcestis. Ten words or expressions occurring in Alcestis' speech in 285-99 reappear in Admetus' speech in 643-60:

285 <i>ἄνδρα</i>	653 <i>ἄνδρα</i>
286 <i>τυραννίδι</i>	654 <i>τυραννίδι</i>
288 <i>ὀρφανοῖσιν</i>	657 <i>ὀρφανόν</i>
cf. 297 <i>ὠρφάνευες</i>	
289 <i>ἡβης</i>	654 <i>ἡβησας</i>
cf. 316 <i>ἡβης</i>	
290 <i>προὔδοσαν</i>	659 <i>προὔδωκα</i>
291 <i>ἦκον βίου</i>	643 <i>ἦκον βίου</i>

292 <i>παῖδα</i>	645 <i>παῖδός</i>
295 <i>ἔζων . . . τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον</i>	650 <i>ὁ λοιπὸς ἦν βιώσιμος χρόνος</i>
299 <i>χάριν</i>	660 <i>χάριν</i>

Moreover, some of Alcestis' arguments seem to have suggested points to Admetus. Her criticism of Pheres and his mother for refusing to die for him he takes over directly; compare 290-7 with 642-50. 651-2 have appeared to some editors too obvious an echo of 295-6 to be genuine, but if they are accepted,<sup>1</sup> we have in Admetus' speech every gradation of reminiscence from the verbal repetition of a particular argument to the half-conscious or unconscious use of isolated words in different contexts. In either case, the *verbal* material of 295 is taken up and applied to Pheres in 650, so that the presence of Alcestis' words in her husband's mind is not in doubt. In other cases, too, Admetus adapts rather than borrows. Thus 653-4, where Admetus reminds his father that his early life had been happy, seem to derive from 285-6, where Alcestis had described the happy life she might have had if she had been willing to let Admetus die and herself marry again. Alcestis had said in effect: 'I might have had a prosperous life if I had not chosen to die for you. If your parents had died in your place, both you and I might have lived for the time remaining to us.' In the speech of Admetus the argument suggested by this is: 'You might well have died for me, for the time remaining to you was short, and hitherto you have had a prosperous life.' Again, Alcestis' point in 293-4 that Admetus was an only child and that his parents could not expect others suggested to him a number of arguments, for example 641, 655-7, and especially the cruel taunt in 662 ff.:

*τοιγὰρ φυτεύων παῖδας οὐκέτ' ἂν φθάνοις κ.τ.λ.*

The influence of Alcestis' speech on Admetus is shown in three ways: by the arguments he takes directly from it, by the adaptation he makes of other arguments from it, and by his use in a new

<sup>1</sup> I am grateful to Professor R. E. Wycherley for this suggestion.

context of words and expressions suggested by it.<sup>1</sup>

Admetus' quarrel with his father has seemed to many critics a repulsive interlude. It is, indeed, shocking, and to no one more than to Admetus himself. The fury of his onset<sup>2</sup> shows the strain of mind resulting from his wife's death and the unpleasant interview with Heracles, and leaning on his wife's words he tries to throw off his own uneasiness by a forthright attack on the selfishness of Pheres, leading him to go beyond the bounds of decency in 662-5 when he rejects his duty of giving his father burial; in this he is matched by Pheres himself (726). What is the point of this, and why is Pheres so unpleasant a character? In order to shake still further the emotional compromise he had reached in the early part of the play, Admetus is subjected to this miserable quarrel with one who is near and should be dear to him, in the course of which things are said on both sides likely to offend the Greek or, indeed, any humane sensibility. He is given for the first time an outside view of his own conduct, and, worse still, the complacency and ignoble love of life which he sees and censures in his father he eventually comes to find in himself. Once again there is a lapse of time before the scene takes effect in Admetus' mind; his last words to his father show no change of attitude, but his speech on returning from Alcestis' funeral, especially 954-61, is the outcome of the quarrel.<sup>3</sup> Euripides does not present the tame spectacle of Admetus immediately accepting an outside view of his own conduct, but the almost tragic one of him fighting against it and losing.

The repetitions noted hitherto have been due to the delayed action of emotional crises in Admetus' mind, with one exception: his use in order to deceive Heracles of a paradox first introduced by the serving-woman. Other repeti-

tions of this latter type appear when the nature of his enlightenment is considered. At the time of Alcestis' death Admetus, for all his grief, acquiesces, and by the use of the crassest irony in the words he gives to Admetus Euripides makes clear the blindness of that acquiescence (cf. 273-9, 382, 386, 391). As the serving-woman had put it to the Chorus (145), οὐπω τόδ' οἶδε δεσπότης, πρὶν ἂν πάθῃ. In the speech beginning at 935 Admetus has at last come to see that it is possible *propter uitam uiuendi perdere causas*, and with the ἄρτι μανθάνω of 940 comes an echo of the serving-woman's words, uniting the two utterances in the wider context of the παθεῖν μαθεῖν adage and marking the beginning and the end of the process of enlightenment. Admetus not only sees with another's eyes his own conduct in accepting Alcestis' sacrifice, but he sees Alcestis' true value to him, and realizes that his own existence depends on her life, not, as he had thought, on her death. The remarks of the Chorus and of the servants about Alcestis have often been treated together as Euripides' expedient for exhibiting the character of Alcestis. In fact the viewpoint of the Chorus is quite different from that of the servants. The men of Phrae take the same attitude to Alcestis as Pheres and as Admetus in his earlier mood; they praise her nobility and unselfishness and lament with their king in his misfortune. The serving-woman and the attendant, on the other hand, emphasize the devotion of the servants to their mistress (192-5, 769-71), since they see the part she has played in Admetus' home. In his speech on returning from the tomb Admetus shows that he too has come to see Alcestis from this point of view, and has learnt the truth of his son's cry (414-15):

οἰχομένης δὲ σοῦ, μήτηρ, ὅλωλεν οἶκος.

The words in which he anticipates the cold welcome that awaits him in his home are those with which the serving-woman had described the warmth of the servants' farewell to their mistress:

Admetus (941-2)

πῶς γὰρ δόμων τῶνδ' εἰσόδους ἀνέξομαι,  
τὴν ἂν προσειπῶν, τοῦ δὲ προσρηθείς ὅπο;

<sup>1</sup> Without treating the textual problem in detail, it may be noted that the above interpretation assumes (and is an argument for) the genuineness of 287-9, which some critics (e.g. M. L. Earle, *C.R.* xviii (1904), p. 336) have rejected.

<sup>2</sup> Note the abruptness of the end-stopped lines, 629-33.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Pohlenz, *Griechische Tragödie*, pp. 246-7.

*Serving-woman (194-5)*

κοῦτις ἦν οὕτω κακὸς  
ὃν οὐ προσεῖπε καὶ προσερρήθη πάλλιν.

The speeches of the serving-woman have a preparatory function not only in the obvious way of setting forth the circumstances at the outset of the action, but also because at three points of importance in the play her words come back with different and greater significance in the speeches of Admetus.<sup>1</sup> This again, seen from the standpoint of the human action, is accidental, and on that very account the more effective.

3. *The Hospitality of Admetus*

How is the saving of Alcestis related to the change of attitude and to the character of Admetus? Is it to be taken as a mere accident, and her restoration to her husband as nothing but a pretext for exhibiting Admetus in a happy situation which we feel he has now deserved or at least can appreciate?<sup>2</sup> Here again Euripides makes use of the mythical side of the story. The myth of Apollo the hired labourer which opens the play sets before us the only characteristic of Admetus on which any stress is laid, his hospitality and righteousness.<sup>3</sup> The myth is taken up by the Chorus in the song which follows the

<sup>1</sup> A fourth anticipation of less importance and different character in the serving-woman's speech occurs at 210 οὐ γὰρ τι πάντες εὖ φρονοῦσι κοῖράνοις, which prepares for Admetus' words in 954 ἐπεὶ δὲ μ' ὅστις ἐχθρὸς ὦν κυρεῖ τῶδε. For dramatic reasons the Chorus must take the earlier view held by Admetus, and Euripides, always careful to leave no loose ends, thus suggests that other Phraeans might take a different view of Alcestis' death.

<sup>2</sup> After all, the change of attitude is perhaps not very great; cf. R. A. Browne, *A.J.P.* lxi (1943), 2, p. 164.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. 9-10: καὶ τόνδ' ἔσφιζον οἶκον ἐς τόδ' ἡμέρας.  
ὁσίον γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ὁσίου ὦν ἐτύγχανον.

entry of Heracles into Admetus' house (568 ff.) with explicit reference to the hospitality and nobility of Admetus, and marks their whole-hearted acceptance of his defence of his conduct towards his guest. His hospitality prevents him from revealing Alcestis' death to Heracles, and yet is indirectly a cause of its revelation, for it leads to Heracles' unintentional provocation of the servant. This virtue is insisted on to the end. The trick by which Alcestis is restored to her husband is not only entertaining in itself; it provides a further test of the piety of Admetus both to his guest and to the last behests of the wife whom he still thinks dead. Heracles takes his leave of Admetus with the words (1147-9):

καὶ δίκαιος ὦν  
τὸ λοιπόν, Ἄδμητ', εὐσέβει περὶ ξένους  
καὶ χαῖρ' κτλ.

and by declining for the present Admetus' request (1151)

μείνον παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ ξυνέστιος γενεῶ.

Admetus has, as a permanent part of his character, that which, in spite of anything he does in the course of the action, wins the goodwill of the powers that can for a time suspend the demands of Death, and in this he resembles Orpheus, whose power he envies in 357 ff., and Laodamia, to whom Euripides intends a reference in 348 ff. Thus within the bounds of the play is justified the belief of the Chorus expressed at the end of the song in which, at a turning-point in the action, they celebrate the hospitality of Admetus (604-5):

πρὸς δ' ἐμῇ ψυχῇ θάρσος ἦσται  
θεοσεβῇ φῶτα κεδνὰ πράξειν.

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## NOTES ON THE HOMERIC EPIGRAM TO THE POTTERS

THE Homeric *Epigram to the Potters* is given in the *Vita Herodotea* and by Suidas, and l. 3 is also quoted by Pollux (x. 85).<sup>1</sup>

Line 3. This should, I suggest, read

<sup>1</sup> In writing these notes I have had the benefit of the criticisms of Professor D. S. Robertson and Mr. E. A. Lane. I am most grateful to them.

εὖ δὲ μελανθεῖεν κότυλοι καὶ πάντ' ἀλάβαστρα. For μελανθεῖεν Suidas has μαρνανθεῖεν which makes no sense, and Pollux περανθεῖεν. But μελανθεῖεν has not only the most authority but the best meaning, as Wilamowitz observed (*Ilias u. Homer*, 432, n. 2); and since Wilamowitz wrote, the researches of Dr. T. Schumann

have shown that the achievement of the black 'paint' of much Greek pottery was even trickier than had before been supposed (*A.A.* 1942, 512-28). In the last two feet of the line the manuscripts of the *Vita* and of Suidas have πάντα μάλ' ἰ(ε)ρά, Pollux πάντα κánaστρα. Plainly what is required is the name of some common type of earthenware pot. μάλ' ἰ(ε)ρά anyhow is corrupt, and Allen's emendation μάλευρα is not convincing, since it is not certain nor particularly likely that μάλευρον was ever used of pottery. κánaστρα is little better, though since he introduces the line as an example of its use Pollux evidently found the word in the text from which he quoted. He continues γίνεται δ' οὐ κεράμεα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλης ὕλης . . . τὰ μέντοι κánaστρα φελλώδεις τινὲς πινακίσκοι εἶναι δοκοῦσιν, and in fact κánaστρα were normally of wicker. That Pollux may have been surprised by the use of the word in the epigram is suggested by another passage—ταῦτα δὲ ὅσα κατὰ φιάλας ἀνεπέπτατο, καὶ κánaστρα καλούμενα εὐρεῖν ἔστι παρὰ Νικοφῶντι τῷ κωμικῷ, ὡς καὶ παρὰ Κρατίνῳ βαλάνων ἄβακα (vi. 86). Ἀλάβαστρον, on the other hand, is a well-attested name for a popular type of Hellenic earthenware pot (see, e.g., J. D. Beazley, *B.S.A.* xxix. 187; O. Jahn, *Beschreibung der Vasensammlung*, lxxxv, n. 601). Its name, however, suggests that its proper material was alabaster, and, indeed, there are many alabaster alabastra: this may have contributed to the corruption of the text at a time when alabastra of earthenware were no more than a memory, that is (according to H. E. Angermeier, *Das Alabastron*, 17) after the Hellenistic period.

*Line 6.* Most of the manuscripts of the *Vita* read ἡμῖν δὲ δὴ ὥς σφι νοῆσαι, but there is the variant αἰεῖσαι. Abel emended to ἡμῖν δ' ἑδανοῖς φρένα ἦσαι, Wilamowitz to ἡμῖν δ' ἡδέως σφιν αἰεῖσαι. But the mercenary tone of the *Epigram* suggests that the last word may have been ὀνήσαι, and perhaps the clause should be restored ἡμᾶς δὲ δὴ ὥς σφας ὀνήσαι or ἡμᾶς δὲ δὴ ἴσον ὀνήσαι.

*Lines 9-10.* The five devils listed here may be expected to be particular to

common accidents of the craft of pottery. *Σύντρυψ* should see to breakages, perhaps those caused by bad stacking of the pots in the kiln. *Σμάραγος*, since the word is associated with noise, may well deal with the bursting of pots that may happen at the beginning of the firing if the temperature is raised too quickly. *Ἀσβετος* has the sense of 'unquenchable', and his province should be the raising too high of the heat in the kiln, for overfiring injures most kinds of earthenware. *Ἀμακτος* is the most likely name of the fourth devil: it has as much authority as any of the other readings and more than the popular *Σαβάκτης*, and the proper kneading of the clay is a necessary preliminary to throwing a pot. It is less easy to guess the misfortune over which *Ῥμόδαμος* presides, but some damage to the pot while still unfired—and *ὥμος* is used in that sense—is more probable than an affliction of the potter's shoulder. I do not think that the general destruction of ll. 11-12 is to be assigned to *Ῥμόδαμος*, and, indeed, it is hardly in keeping with the character given him in the preceding line. But anyhow, the beginning of l. 11 is corrupt: I should like to restore an optative verb and a noun in the nominative.

*Line 14.* The manuscripts have βρύκοι δὲ κάμνος πάντ' ἔντοσθ' αὐτῆς κεραμῆα λεπτά πο(ι)οῦσα. The primary meaning of *λεπτός* is 'fine', 'delicate', and this is found in the paragraph with which the *Vita* and Suidas introduce the epigram—κάμνον ἐγκαίοντες κεράμουν λεπτοῦ: compare also λεπτοκεραμεῖον and λεπτοκεραμεύς and the use of *λεπτόν* quoted in *L.S.*<sup>9</sup> s.v. *λεπτός* III. 3—all, however, from papyri. I have not found parallels for the sense 'fragmented', which the reading of the manuscripts in l. 14 requires. The *λεπτά τίλαι* of Theocritus 3. 21 and *λεπτοτομήσας* of Strabo xv. 727 are not precisely comparable, for both *τίλλω* and *τέμνω* contain the idea of partition, and *λεπτός* need only define the quality of the parts. The compound *λεπτοποιῶ*, which occurs in Galen and Oribasius, has again (so far as I can understand the passages) the sense of fineness or thinness rather



than of partition. In l. 14, therefore, *λεπρά* probably goes with *κεραμήια* and not with the participle, and perhaps the original reading was *λέπτ' ἀπολούσα* (for

Attic forms in the epigram see Wackernagel, *Glotta*, vii. 254). R. M. COOK.

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### PROPERTIUS i. 9. 23-4

nullus Amor cuiquam faciles ita praebuit alas  
ut non alterna presserit ille manu.

POSTGATE suggested that the image underlying this couplet was either of tying a bird to a string, letting it fly a little way and pulling it back (for which he compared Ar. *Nub.* 763 and *Romeo and Juliet* II. ii. 178) or of chariot driving, derived from the myth in the *Phaedrus* (for this he compared Meleager, *A.P.* xii. 119. 2 *θεὸς θανάτῳ ἀνιοχεῖ κραδίαν* and Anacr. 4. 3-4 *Diehl τῆς ἐμῆς / ψυχῆς ἡνιοχεύεις*); he added that he preferred the second explanation.<sup>1</sup> He went on to explain *alterna* as 'pulling and loosing alternately', with a reference to ii. 12. 7 *alterna iactamur in unda*, where he defined *alterna* as describing 'two contrasting phenomena alternately. . . . Here . . . the up and down motion of the waves', and *manu* as 'movement of the hand'. Other suggestions will be found in Butler and Barber's note on the passage, which will suffice to show the embarrassment which this couplet has caused to commentators.

In 23 it is almost certain that Propertius had in mind the well-known erotic commonplace of the lover given wings by Love. This was already known to Anacreon (52. 1-2 *Diehl ἀναπέτομαι δὴ πρὸς Ὀλυμπον περὶ γέσσει κόρυμβας* /

<sup>1</sup> Butler and Barber appear to misrepresent Postgate's views, but his edition was last revised in 1884, and this may be one of the points on which he later changed his mind (see his note in the later reprints of the revised edition). The passage from Meleager refers to Bacchus; to Postgate's references should be added Ibycus 7 *Diehl* (where this image is already implied), *Hermesianax* 7. 83-4 Powell οἷδ' οἷδ' (the philosophers) αἰνὸν Ἐρωτος ἀπεστρέφαντο κυδοιμὸν / μαινομένον, δεινὸν δ' ἦλθον ὑφ' ἡνιόχον (where *Hermesianax* is adapting Anacr. 34 *Diehl* ἀστραγάλοι δ' Ἐρωτός εἰον / μανία τε καὶ κυδοιμοί), *Mel. A.P.* xii. 86. 2 ἀρσένα δ' αὐτὸς Ἐρως ἡμερον ἡνιοχεῖ, *Ov. A.A.* i. 3-8 (with a characteristically Ovidian inversion of the commonplace image, especially 8 *Automedon dicar Amoris ego*) and *Marc. Arg. A.P.* ix. 221. 1-4 Ἐρωτα / χεροὶ λεοντείαν ἡνιοχεύοντα βίαν, / ὥς τῇ μὲν μαστίγῃ κατ' αὐχένος, ἔδ' ἐκ χαλίνους / εὐθύνει.

διὰ τὸν Ἐρωτ'), and by the fourth century it had led among the *Homeridae* to the explanation of Ἐρως as derived from Πτέρως, διὰ πτεροφύτορ' ἀναγκήν (*Pl. Phaedr.* 252 b). The use which Propertius made of this image (the lover metamorphosed into a bird) in 24 is less certain. The choice seems to lie between the pet bird teased by its mistress (cf. *Catull.* 2. 2) and the lover harnessed to Love's chariot in place of the more conventional birds (cf. *Ov. Am.* i. 2. 25-6). In deciding between these two, the main factors are the context and the correct interpretation of *alterna . . . manu*.

Propertius, the experienced lover, is warning the novice Ponticus that his present sufferings are not caused *uero . . . igni*, but are *uenturi prima favilla mali* (18). Real suffering begins with repeated attacks of desire (21 *pueri totiens arcum sentire medullis*), which lead to anger on the part of one's mistress, presumably because the desire is not always for her (cf. ii. 34. 3 *nemo est in amore fidelis*), and to complete but reluctant confession (22 *nihil iratae posse negare tuae*). Then follow the two lines under discussion. Propertius goes on to emphasize that, if one's mistress is jealous, the end is complete slavery (25-32), and then the only remedy for attacks of fickleness will be immediate confession (33 *quam primum errata fatere*), which often gives relief (34). Thus the context seems to require some allusion at 23-4 to the lover's fickleness, rather than to the 'cat and mouse' tricks of his mistress.

The phrase *alterna manus* occurs three times in Propertius: here, in i. 11. 12 *alternae facilis cedere lympa manu* (of Cynthia swimming), and in iv. 7. 18 *alterna ueniens in tua colla manu* (of Cynthia sliding down a rope on to Propertius' shoulders). Since in the two last cases *alterna manus* evidently means 'moving each hand alternately', it is

natural to suppose that Love too is imagined as moving his hands alternately to check the lover's movements. If the allusion is to the teasing of a pet bird, the inclusion of *alterna* in this sense is otiose; and the only possible interpretation of it would be 'now moving a hand forward, and now drawing it back' (and so alternately checking and freeing the bird). Postgate's interpretation, 'pulling and loosing alternately', follows the same line, and in his note on ii. 12. 7 *alterna* . . . *unda* he quoted ii. 26. 54 *alternante uorans* (*uacans* Butler and Barber) *uasta Charybdis aqua* and *Aen.* xi. 426-7 *multos alterna reuisens* / *lusit et in solido rursus Fortuna locauit*, rendering the second "'the tide of Fortune", now ebbing, now flowing'. Whether *alterna* in the second passage is feminine nominative singular or neuter accusative plural, the sense is still 'favouring now one side, now the other',<sup>1</sup> and there is no need to interpret as 'now up, now down'. 'Now rising, now falling' would suit the water alternately swallowed and vomited out by Charybdis, but so would 'washing now this way, now that'. So in ii. 12. 7 *alterna* . . . *unda* may just as well mean 'the wave coming now from this

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Liv. xxiii. 26. 11 'in hoc alterno pauore' (the Tarsesii had at first fled in panic, but they rallied, and the Carthaginians then broke in their turn, *Stat. Theb.* viii. 424).

side, now from that' (cf. Alc. 30. 2-3 Diehl τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔνθεν κύμα κλίνεται, / τὸ δ' ἔνθεν), as 'the wave now rising, now falling'. It seems that, in the description of the *desultor* (iv. 2. 36) *traicit alterno qui leue pondus equo*, *alterno* can only mean 'now to this (horse), now to that'.<sup>2</sup> I therefore suggest that in i. 9. 24 *alterna* . . . *manu* more probably means 'now with this hand, now with that' than 'pulling and loosing alternately'.

Sense can best be made of this suggestion if we imagine Love as a charioteer, driving the winged soul of the lover. The lover cannot use his wings freely (for *faciles* cf. *κούφαις* in Anacr. 52 quoted above), but must obey Love's hand on the reins. Love pulls now with one hand, now with the other, turning the lover from side to side, to one object of desire after another. So 'Love never grants to anyone wings for his free use, but only on such a tenure that he checks their course, now with this hand now with that', while the lover vainly struggles against the rein (cf. *Aen.* xi. 600-1 *pressis pugnat habentis*, / *huc conuersus et huc*).

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. Liv. xxiii. 29. 5 'Numidae . . . quibus desultorum in modum binos trahentibus equos inter acerrimam saepe pugnam in recentem equum ex fesso armatis transultare mos est'.

## VITRUVIUS vi. 1. 4

ex eo quoque quae sub septentrionibus nutriuntur immanibus corporibus, candidis coloribus, directo capillo et rufo, oculis caesiis, sanguine multo ab umoris plenitudine caelique refrigerationibus sunt conformati. (4) qui autem sunt proximi ad axem meridianum subiectique solis cursui brevioribus corporibus, colore fusco, crispo capillo, oculis nigris, *cruribus validis*, sanguine exiguo solis impetu perficiuntur.

So EGH. *validis* has been objected to for two reasons, one good and the other bad. The good reason, which is sufficient in itself, is that southern peoples, here as so often elsewhere, are described as being smaller and weaker than northern races. Stout legs do not befit them. The bad reason is that there is nothing in the preceding sentence to balance *cruribus validis*. But the parallelism is

not carried through in detail: to *directo capillo et rufo* corresponds only *crispo capillo*, and there is a lack of balance between the ends of the two sentences.

Iocundus in 1513 conjectured *invalidis*, and was followed by many editors, including Rose-Müller-Strübing and Choisy. Rose later (2nd ed., 1899) read *squalidis*, observing that *squalidus* is equated with *αἰχμηρός* in C.G.L. ii. 187, 252. Nohl, followed by Krohn, deleted the words as an interpolation. Walter (*Phil. Woch.* 1924, 402) suggested *evanidis*, comparing *Moretum* 32.<sup>1</sup> Wester-

<sup>1</sup> Brakman, *Mnemosyne*, lx. 154, points out that *evanidis* will not do, as it means 'id quod sensim paulatimque evanescit'.

wick (*Phil. Woch.* 1935, 174) proposed to transfer the offending words a few lines above, after *immanibus corporibus*.

Vitruvius is evidently repeating the doctrine concerning northern and southern races, later elaborated by Polemon of Laodicea during the reign of Hadrian,<sup>1</sup> and possibly originally formulated by the Hippocratic school. Polemon attributed fat legs to the northerners and thin legs to the southerners.<sup>2</sup>

This consideration might tempt us to read *cruribus invalidis* in § 4 and to insert *cruribus validis* in Vitruvius' description of the northern races. But (i) the remedy is a drastic one, (ii) *validus* does not mean 'fat', (iii) there is reason to believe that the opposition of fat and

thin legs is not an original part of the distinction between northern and southern races at all, but was imported into it by Polemon or his source. The pseudo-Aristotelian *Physiognomonica* gives long thin legs as the mark of the *δαιλός*<sup>3</sup> and fat fleshy legs as that of the *ἀναισθητός*,<sup>4</sup> and this opposition is repeated by the later physiognomonic writers.<sup>5</sup>

The key to the problem is provided by a passage in Petronius (102. 15). Encolpius has suggested that he and his companion Giton should disguise themselves as Ethiopians by smearing their bodies with ink. Giton scornfully points out that mere change of colour is not enough: the whole form of their bodies must be changed if the disguise is to be successful: 'age, numquid et labra possumus tumore taeterrimo implere? numquid et crines calamistro convertere? numquid et frontes cicatricibus scindere? numquid et crura in orbem pandere?' etc. Petronius seems to have considered bow legs as characteristic of 'Ethiopians'. In the Vitruvius passage under discussion we should read *cruribus valgis*, which is palaeographically easy, and is supported by the passage in Petronius.

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<sup>3</sup> § 14 (Foerster, i. 28. 5).

<sup>4</sup> § 16 (Foerster, i. 30. 4).

<sup>5</sup> Compare the Arabic Polemon 6 (Foerster, i. 202. 17) and 7 (i. 204. 9), Adamantius 2. 7 (Foerster, i. 357. 2), Anon. *de Physiognomonica* 71 (Foerster, ii. 90. 2), 91 (ii. 120. 10), and 105 (ii. 129. 11).

## A METELLUS IN TWO PASSAGES OF DIO

Cassius Dio lli. 13. 2: τεκμήριον δέ, Μάριος μὲν καὶ Σύλλας καὶ Μέτελλος, καὶ Πομπήιος τὸ πρῶτον, ἐν κράτει τῶν πραγμάτων γενόμενοι, οὐτ' ἠθέλησαν δυναστεύσαι οὐτ' ἔπαθον παρὰ τοῦτο δεινὸν οὐδέν.

lvi. 39. 2: οἱ καὶ τὸν Πομπήιον καὶ τὸν Μέτελλον τὸν τότε ἀνθήσαντα ἐπήνεσαν οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὴ τὰς δυνάμεις μετ' ὧν ἐπολέμησαν ἐθέλονται διαφῆκαν.

To which of the Metelli is Dio referring?<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The matter was brought to my notice by Professor H. M. Last. I have to thank him for his guidance in preparing this note, and Messrs. Russell Meiggs and J. M. Cobban for helpful suggestions.

The first edition of Dio with an index<sup>2</sup> (Xylander-H. Stephanus, 1591) has a marginal note 'Metellus Creticus' against the second passage (p. 682), and in the index the entry 'Metellus Creticus, laudatus quod copias dimisisset'; and this reappears word for word in the index of Leunclavius (1606). Reimar (1750, vol. ii, p. 837) has the following note on the second passage: 'Metellus

<sup>2</sup> Details of all these editions before the Loeb can be found in U. P. Boissevain, *Cassii Dionis Cocceiani Historiarum Romanarum quae supersunt*, Berlin, 1895, vol. i, pp. xciii ff.

idem fecit [i.e. laid down his forces] victor Creta rediens, quem ex illa magna victoria nihil quam cognomen Cretici reportasse scribit Florus iii. 7 ult.' Sturz (1824) puts both references under Creticus in his index; Bekker (1849) does not give them at all. The *Index Historicus* (vol. iv) of Boissevain's edition, completed and checked by himself, puts both under the heading '[Q. Caecilius] Metellus [Numidicus]'. The Loeb editor, however (vol. vii, p. 87), prefers Creticus, following the note of Reimar, and lists both passages under Creticus in his index.

The difficulty of deciding the identity of this Metellus is due to our lack of the full text of the early books of Dio, so that we do not know what incident in connexion with a Metellus he had in mind. But there are two criteria. In lvi. 39. 2 he makes quite explicit the grounds on which Pompey and Metellus are singled out for virtue: they dismissed their soldiers voluntarily. Secondly, lii. 13. 2 shows that the man of whom Dio was thinking must have been in a position to establish a *δυναστεία* if he had wanted to. The occasions on which Marius, Sulla, and Pompey made their renunciations are too well known to need mention; but they give a clue to the kind of thing with which our Metellus must be connected.

Creticus, as consul in 69 B.C., set about subjugating the pirate strongholds of Crete, so ruthlessly that when the Cretans heard of Pompey's new command under the Lex Gabinia they appealed to him over Metellus' head to receive their submission.<sup>1</sup> Pompey agreed, and a feud began between the two commanders which was only prevented from coming to open warfare by Pompey's more pressing Eastern commitments.<sup>2</sup> Metellus was left to complete his task in his own brutal way. In 63 he returned to Italy and appeared before Rome claiming a triumph; but it was not awarded him until 62, and even then his design to exhibit the captured chieftains, Lasithenes and Panares, was frustrated by

the jealousy of Pompey.<sup>3</sup> The passage of Florus<sup>4</sup> to which Reimar referred does not imply any voluntary surrender of honours or powers by Creticus, but merely that he was baulked of what he considered his deserts.<sup>5</sup>

Numidicus has still less in his favour. He was consul in 109 B.C., fought Jugurtha, was ousted from his command by the intrigues of Marius, but nevertheless received a triumph upon his return to Rome in 106. He was, however, in no position to establish a *δυναστεία*, for he had left his armies behind in Numidia to be handed over by a subordinate;<sup>6</sup> and, far from giving them up voluntarily, he had been superseded in a regular way by the appointment of Marius to Africa. In choosing him Boissevain was perhaps thinking of his famous voluntary retirement into exile; but this will not stand against the explicit mention of dismissal of troops in lvi. 39. 2. Moreover, if Dio intended Numidicus, it is difficult to see why he should have sandwiched him in between Sulla and Pompey in lii. 13. 2; nor does τὸν τότε ἀνθήσαντα make much sense except as an indication that the man in question was at any rate roughly a contemporary of Pompey.<sup>7</sup>

The brothers Metellus Celer and Nepos fulfil this condition well enough; but an examination of the evidence for their careers shows no incident in connexion with either of them that fits the context of these passages satisfactorily.

There is, however, one Metellus who does fulfil all the requirements. Metellus Pius was praetor in 89, took an important part in the Social War, and

<sup>3</sup> Velleius ii. 34. 1 and 2; 40. 5.

<sup>4</sup> Florus i. 42. 6 (= iii. 7 ult.). The whole chapter shows that the Cretan war was a bad business, and reflected little credit on anyone.

<sup>5</sup> A conclusion which is confirmed by Sallust, B.C. 30. 4: 'ei utrique [Metellus and Q. Marcius Rex] ad urbem imperatores erant, inpediti ne triumpharent calumniam paucorum.'

<sup>6</sup> Sallust, B.J. 86. 5.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. the Loeb note on lvi. 39. 2. Of course, if τότε is pressed to mean strictly 'at the same date', the context must be that of 63-62 B.C. and the Metellus must be Creticus. But Dio's use of τότε equally well sanctions a looser interpretation. See Boissevain's edition, vol. v, *Index Graecitatis*, s.v. τότε.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, *de Imp. Cn. Pomp.* 35 and 46.

<sup>2</sup> Dio xxxvi. 45. 1 ff.



hurried to Rome in 87 to protect the city against Marius and Cinna. But he refused to take the supreme command against them out of the hands of the supine C. Octavius, in spite of the clamour of the troops for him to do so.<sup>1</sup> In 80 he was consul with Sulla, and went to Spain in 79, where he was engaged in constant warfare with Sertorius until 71. After the battle of Saguntum he received honours which would well justify the term ἀνθήσαντα.<sup>2</sup> Returning home in 71, he dismissed his army in north Italy,<sup>3</sup> while Pompey sat with his at the gates of Rome and extorted a triumph from a reluctant Senate, and Crassus secured an ovation by the same

means. At the end of the year Pius and Pompey celebrated their triumphs and Crassus his ovation; and the contrast between Pius' behaviour and Pompey's did not pass unnoticed.<sup>4</sup>

Thus twice in his career Metellus Pius made a renunciation, and on the second occasion a positive one of precisely the kind to which Dio is referring. The choice of a man to fit our two passages certainly lies between him and Creticus, and in spite of the support which the latter has had from the editors, it is Pius who has the better credentials and who was much the greater man in his day.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, *Mar.* 42. 5: ἦκον ὡς ἐκείνον ἀρχειν δεόμενοι καὶ σάξιν τὴν πόλιν.

<sup>2</sup> Sallust, *Hist.* ii, frag. 70 (M.); Val. Max. ix. 1. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Sallust, *Hist.* iv, frag. 49 (M.): 'exercitum dimisit ut primum Alpibus digressus est.' The attribution of this fragment to Pius and to this occasion is a conjecture; but it is difficult to see to whom else it could refer.

<sup>4</sup> Velleius ii. 30. 2.

<sup>5</sup> See especially Val. Max. v. 2. 7: 'principatu quem procul dubio obtinebat.' Cicero speaks of Pius, for his own purposes, of course, as 'vir sanctissimus et summa religione ac modestia' in *Pro Balbo* 22. 50.

#### THE PAST OPTATIVE

*Od.* xviii. 79: νῦν μὲν μήτ' εἴης, βουγαίε, μήτε γένοιο...

THE accepted rendering of the aorist optative γένοιο here is as if it referred to past time, so that the meaning of the line would be 'it were well, you braggart, both if you did not exist and if you had not been born'. But does γένοιο refer to the past? There is no need to accept such an hypothesis, which attributes an extremely rare meaning to the optative. In my view the reference in γένοιο is probably to the future, as in the common phrase μή γένοιτο 'may it not happen'. The difference between that μή γένοιτο and our μήτε γένοιο is that the first is a realizable wish, the second unrealizable. The simple wish, or curse, would be μή εἴης 'would that you did not exist': the poet adds something to the curse when he puts in μή γένοιο 'would that you might not be born hereafter', making it far more comprehensive and telling. He would add nothing if he said 'would that you had not been born', because that is only a variation of 'would that you did not exist'. In our passage the meaning is concessive (see Monro, *Homeric Grammar*, § 299 (d)), 'you might as well not exist, and not be born hereafter'.

There is a possible alternative, that γένοιο is properly timeless, the aorist describing a single, completed act but not specifying the time of its occurrence (see Thompson, *Syntax of Attic Greek*<sup>2</sup>, p. 377). For this compare *Il.* xiii. 825-6 εἰ γὰρ... διὸς πάϊς... εἶην ἡμᾶτα πάντα, τέκοι δέ με πότνια Ἥρη. Here the two wishes are identical in general nature: 'would that I were the son of Zeus and of

Hera'. The difference of tense in εἶην and τέκοι is due to the different aspect of the verbal ideas. εἶην 'would that I were the son' (continuous); τέκοι 'would that Hera bore me' (single, completed act). On this analogy the meaning of *Od.* xviii. 79 would be 'you might as well neither exist, nor have birth', in which the reference in 'have birth' is not more to the past than to the present or future. But there is less force in the line on this interpretation.

By accepting either rendering we are freed from the need to take the optative γένοιο as a wish referring definitely to past time. Such a use is not inherited by Greek from I.E., as are the uses referring to present and future time; and I think that we need never assume its existence in Greek at all, where wishes are concerned.

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#### PLATO'S PHILOSOPHIC DOG

(*Republic* ii. 375 a-376 c)

WHY is a φύλαξ like a σκύλαξ? Because a well-bred dog, full of spirit, ready to attack unknown strangers but always gentle with his own folk, shows the same characteristics as the courageous defender of his city. As the dog must know who are those of his own household and who are not, he must have some taste for knowledge and be in some sense φιλόσοφος. Therefore the human φύλαξ must have a philosophic as well as a spirited disposition. This is the sort of argument to which Plato's enemies point when they want to show how silly Plato was. His friends, who know him better,

say quite rightly that we must not take Plato's little jokes seriously. But what is the point of the joke? If this is just another instance of the Socratic habit of homely comparisons, there is no joke and we have to hand the passage back to Plato's foes. Perhaps, however, the real point of the joke has been missed. Plato seems here to be parodying the method of argument used by the 'Nature' school of sophists, who advised that men should follow *φύσις* not *νόμος*. The notion that observation of nature, especially of the animal world, will show what is the way for men to behave was taken seriously. And to the unspoken objection that it is not 'in Nature' for a courageous and spirited man to restrain his impulses and refrain from attacking others Plato playfully replies 'On the contrary, you will find warrant for it in the animal world. Just look at the dog, whose behaviour is according to your own theories *natural*. So there is nothing unnatural or impossible about my *φίλας*. He is *δυνατός καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν*' (375 e). Plato carries the joke still farther. Certain sophists such as 'Callicles' in the *Gorgias*

(484 c) and Isocrates (*Panaih.* 28) were in the habit of decrying *φιλοσοφία* as fit fare for the young but hardly worth the serious attention of grown men, least of all the big strong superman praised by Callicles. Plato has a thrust at these people too. Nature shows that a dog is *φιλομαθής*, and, if a dog, then according to the *φύσις* theory, also a man; and if *φιλομαθής* then also *φιλόσοφος*. There is a particular pleasure in hoisting your opponent with his own petard.

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LUCRETIIUS iii. 962

aequo animoque agendum magnis concede:  
necessest.

HAS anyone suggested *humanis*, 'yield to the common lot'? Cicero, who I think had this passage in his mind, writes: '*qui omnia humana, quaecumque accidere possunt, tolerabilia ducat*' (*Tusc. Disp.* v. 17).

W. R. INGE.

## REVIEWS

### HOMERISCHES IN HOMER.

Ernst HOWALD: *Der Dichter der Ilias*.

Pp. 182. Erlenbach-Zürich: Rentsch, 1946. Paper, 8 Sw. fr.

HOWALD accepts the main conclusions of Pestalozzi's *Die Achilleis als Quelle der Ilias* (noticed in C.R. lxi. 29)—indeed, his arguments are often unintelligible unless one has read Pestalozzi; he also resembles Pestalozzi in his admiration for Schadewaldt's *Iliasstudien*, in his renunciation of all the conventional apparatus of scholarship (there are no footnotes, indexes, or bibliography), and in his attitude to his predecessors. Apart from Schadewaldt and Pestalozzi, he refers by name only to Kirchhoff, von der Mühl (1940), and Klingner (1944) on the *Odyssey*, and to his own *Mythos als Dichtung* (1937); all the rest of Homeric scholarship since Wolf (except for work on the *Odyssey* from Kirchhoff to von der Mühl) is summarily dismissed, either as vitiated by a fundamental error ('Die zentrale Frage . . ., die nach dem Dichter und nach seinem Werk, blieb nicht nur nicht beantwortet, sondern der Beantwortung entzogen'), or as the work of 'ästhetisierende Kärner'.

Howald's thesis is the possibility of distinguishing those elements in our

*Iliad* which Homer took over out of earlier epics from those which are genuinely Homeric. Homer's main contribution is defined as the invention of the 'Grossepos' as a literary form; in matters of detail, the genuinely Homeric elements are of two kinds: Homer's own inventions (the main examples are the quarrel over Briseis as the motive for Achilles' wrath and the meetings of Hector and Andromache and of Priam and Achilles), and his adaptations of scenes and characters from earlier epics (e.g. the *Psychostasia* and the carrying of Sarpedon's body to Lycia by Sleep and Death, both from Pestalozzi's *Achilleis*, and the substitution of Phoenix for the aged Patroclus of the assumed earlier *Menis*; Howald argues that in that poem the feeble old man was successful in persuading Achilles to be reconciled to the Achaeans).

After a short introduction (7-9), the book falls into six chapters: 'Der Handlungsablauf der Ilias' (11-62), analysing the *Iliad* as the type of the *Grossepos*; 'Die Patroklie' (63-93), a more detailed analysis of Books XI-XVI; 'Priamos und Achill' (94-117), which discusses Book XXIV; 'Die Vorgeschichte der

*Ilias*' (118-43), dealing with Homer's relation to his predecessors, especially an earlier poem on the Wrath of Achilles and a still older poem on the Wrath of Meleager (Bethe and Müllder are not mentioned); 'Homerisches in der *Ilias*' (144-65), summing up the main characteristics of Homer as a poet, with special reference to Hector and Andromache and to the quarrel over Briseis; and 'Die *Ilias* von der *Odyssee* her angesehen' (166-81), in which Howald argues that our *Odyssey* is an attempt by a post-Homeric poet to expand an Ur-*Odyssey* into a Grossepos on the lines of the *Iliad*, and that it is possible to learn from the methods employed by the writer of our *Odyssey* what elements in the *Iliad* he regarded as genuinely Homeric.

Howald's general conclusion is that the greatness of Homer and his real originality consist in his grasp of the importance of psychological and social factors in the development of events, and in his ability to portray the relationships between man and man, man and woman. This explains the emphasis which Homer, in spite of his 'Chauvinismus', lays on Hector; both in himself and in his relationships with his kinsfolk, friends, and enemies, he provides opportunities for subtle psycho-

logical characterization. This conclusion is reasonable so far as it goes, but to me at least it does not explain why Homer ends his story of the wrath of Achilles with Hector's funeral and not with Achilles' last appearance. Again, one may accept Howald's general thesis that it is possible to distinguish 'Homerisches in der *Ilias*' without accepting either his methods or his conclusions on points of detail. Both Howald and Pestalozzi attempt to argue back from our *Iliad* to the design of pre-Homeric epic; and when Howald goes behind the assumed *Achilleis*, which Homer used, to an assumed *Wrath of Meleager* which provided the theme for later versions of the wrath of Achilles, one can only say, with Herodotus, ἐς τὸ ἀφανὲς τὸν μῦθον ἀνεύεικας οὐκ ἔχει ἐλεγχον.<sup>1</sup>

With all its faults, the book is worth reading as a stimulus to further thought on the Homeric problem.

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<sup>1</sup> Since writing this review, I have learned from Professor J. T. Kakridis's *Ομηρικές Ερευνες* (Athens, 1944—revised edition in English now in preparation) that more can reasonably be said about the *Meleagris* than I had supposed; but Kakridis's conclusions differ so materially from Howald's that I see no reason to change the judgement stated above.

## GREEK MEDICINE

W. H. S. JONES: *Philosophy and Medicine in Ancient Greece*. With an edition of *Περὶ ἀρχαίας ἰητρικῆς*. (Bulletin of the History of Medicine, Supplement No. 8.) Pp. 100. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1946. Paper, \$2.

In this book Dr. Jones gives first of all an introductory account of some of the pre-Hippocratic writers, the purpose of which is to bring out the contrast between 'scientific' and 'philosophical' methods as employed in medical theory, and to provide some striking and unexpected examples of both in the ancient authors, and so to lead up to a consideration of the main treatise dealt with in the volume, viz. *Ancient Medicine*, and its well-known attack on the im-

portation of philosophic methods into medicine. This contrast is further developed in a section on hypotheses in Greek thought, and in the section which directly introduces *Ancient Medicine*. This part of the book readers will find interesting and stimulating: students of ancient philosophy will find a number of challenging statements, their attitude to which they will have to define; the more general reader—for whom, I think, the book is primarily intended: the medical man who has some Greek but not an overabundance of it—will find his attention drawn to some fascinating parts of Greek scientific-philosophical literature, and perhaps be attracted to explore more widely in this field. For such, it will be no particular disadvantage

that Dr. Jones has presented the material in this part of his book in a somewhat expository form; indeed, it may well be an advantage that he has chosen to raise in this way precisely those points which offer problems and suggest lines of thought. There is also a short section on medical etiquette in ancient times.

The second part of the book contains a text of *Ancient Medicine*, followed by a translation accompanied by a short commentary. No claim is made to give a full *apparatus criticus*, but a limited number of manuscript variants is given, together with some proposals made by Gomperz and not available in Heiberg's edition, and some new and attractive conjectures by Cornford; incidentally, Cornford's conjecture ἐπὶ (for ἐν) τὸ θερμόν in ch. 17, line 3, must have been suggested by the ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρόν of the MS. M, but this does not appear from the *apparatus*. In the commentary Dr. Jones incorporates a number of interpretations by Cornford, which, as always, are valuable and stimulating. Dr. Jones's translation is no mere revision of his version in the Loeb edition, but an entirely new one, and brings out with greater clearness the technical terminology of the original, much of which is of great importance in relation to other departments of Greek thought. Thus, not only is there the parallel use in Plato, though in quite a different sense, of the terms εἶδος and κοινωνία, to which Taylor drew attention, but there is also a closer parallel in Anaxagoras, who insists, though for a different reason from *Ancient Medicine*, on the principle of the κοινωνία of the physical elements as against the possibility of their isolation; and again, the notion of concoction (πέψις), which came to play an important part in Aristotle's biological theory, and was held by him to be brought about by heat, seems in *Ancient Medicine* to be a process independent of heat—a view which was no doubt connected with its author's belittlement of the importance of 'the hot' and 'the cold'. In these and other respects *Ancient Medicine* indicates the importance, on the one hand, of realizing the widespread

use of identical terms, though not necessarily in identical senses, and, on the other hand, of tracing the application and development of similar ideas in different contexts and different departments of thought, even where identical terminology is not used.

Variation in the application of technical terms in different departments of study is of course familiar to us to-day. The term δύναμις, on which Dr. Jones gives an Additional Note (would that it had been longer!), is a good example of this in ancient times. Δύναμις is well known as a technical term from Aristotle's use of it in the sense of 'potentiality', a sense which is patently inapplicable in *Ancient Medicine*; but it is not evident that the meaning of δύναμις which is found in the *Phaedrus* (270 c, d) and which Dr. Jones quotes at the beginning of his Note is really relevant either. In *Ancient Medicine* δύναμις appears to have two technical meanings: (1) it is a generic term for certain substances which are constituents both of the body and of its foods; (2) it means the strength which any of these substances possesses. The two are obviously closely connected. In the first sense δύναμις was a regular technical term in early Greek scientific literature, applied to certain definite (supposed) substances; used first perhaps by Alcmaeon, and employed in the same application as late as by Aristotle in his biological work. Whether it is worth while attempting, as Dr. Jones does, to decide when δύναμις is used 'concretely' and when 'abstractly' in *Ancient Medicine* is doubtful, since it is clear that *Ancient Medicine* regards diseases as being due to some one δύναμις becoming 'isolated', i.e. being 'unblent' or 'unmixed' with the others, and therefore stronger by comparison than it should be; and when it has been 'blended' with others its 'strength' is 'tempered' and the trouble is eased; so that health is literally a balance of powers (ἰσονομία, Alcmaeon's word), each power, as it were, in the body politic being on an equality. The author of *Ancient Medicine* held that a chief cause of diseases is a disturbance of this ἰσονομία, con-



sisting in the undue strength of one of the *δυνάμεις*, just as trouble ensues in the city when one of the elements in it dominates the rest. It is the mere fact of its becoming outstanding owing to its strength that is the fault. This is the distinctive theory of *Ancient Medicine*, which must not be confused with other theories, however similar in terminology.

Dr. Jones holds that chapters 20-4 are part of the original treatise, which he dates between 430 and 400 B.C. In another Note he deals with the connexion between chapters 10-12 of *Ancient Medicine* and chapters 28-30 of *Regimen in Acute Diseases*, and concludes that nothing more definite than a close relationship between the two can be established.

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W. H. S. JONES: *The Medical Writings of Anonymus Londinensis*. (Cambridge Classical Studies.) Pp. viii + 168. Cambridge: University Press. 1947. Cloth, 12s. 6d. net.

DR. JONES has intended this book for students of Greek philosophy who realize the importance of Greek medicine for the history of thought but have no special knowledge of it. Hence he has concentrated his attention on the translation of the text, and refers the reader to Diels for textual and similar problems, deliberately avoiding discussion of the many questions raised by the treatise.

To some extent the introductory matter and the appendixes cover the same ground as those in *Philosophy and Medicine in Ancient Greece*. Dr. Jones deals briefly with some of the technical terms in the papyrus, e.g. *δύναμις*, *πνεῦμα*, *περίσσωμα*, *σύντηξις*, and it would, I think, have been an advantage if he had given us a little more on these interesting and important subjects. The most valuable features of the work, apart from the translation, are the generous *testimonia*, considerable passages often being quoted *in extenso*, from the Hippocratic corpus, Aristotle, Galen, Dioscorides, and other authors; and the second excursus, on the nature

of Greek medicine, where a great deal of useful information and comment is given in the compass of nine pages. There are also a number of suggested restorations and interpretations, including some by Cornford, together with a short commentary in the course of footnotes to the translation. Useful, too, are the analysis of chapters 1-4 (the classification of *πάθη*), the list of physicians and philosophers named in the treatise, and the quotations from the Hippocratic corpus to illustrate chapters 14-20.

In dealing with a treatise of this sort the translator encounters many special difficulties, as Dr. Jones points out. Of these not the least is that of the technical terms. Owing to the nature of the document, much of which aims at giving a concise summary of the views of various physicians, these terms occupy a much more prominent place than they would in a less compressed treatise. In the treatment of them in translation there is room for more methods than one. Often a translator may feel that he should adapt his translation to the context, or to English idiom, indeed sometimes obviously he must do so; and yet, when it is a case of specialized terminology, there is the danger that to vary the translation of one and the same term may obscure the use and development of it and the relation between its various applications. The problem is to decide how much rigidity and how much flexibility there should be; and on this point probably no two translators would entirely agree. Dr. Jones's method inclines rather towards flexibility, and it is difficult sometimes to avoid the feeling that he has somewhat overdone this, especially when the same term, clearly bearing the same sense, is variously translated in the course of a few lines. The effect is rather as if, in translating a modern work on chemistry from English into French, the English term 'base', for instance, were represented by two or three different French words. It may be that we are often still too much influenced by the convention that the English translation of works written in Greek must be 'literary' in style, and that technicalities are somehow a little

undignified. At xxi. 32 this tendency has led to a mistranslation, involving the disappearance of an important technical term of Aristotle's, τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ. These points, however, do not fundamentally affect the value of the trans-

lation and its usefulness to the student as providing in an easily accessible and reliable form a document of peculiar interest for the history of Greek medicine and philosophy. A. L. PECK.

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### THE LOST DIODORUS

Diodorus Siculus with an English translation by C. H. OLDFATHER. In 12 vols. Vol. IV: Books IX–XII. 40. (Loeb Classical Library.) Pp. 468; 4 maps. London: Heinemann, 1947. Cloth, 10s. net.

PROFESSOR OLDFATHER maintains a high standard of translation in this as in the earlier volumes, and his English is most readable despite the cumbrous style of the original. The fragments of Books IX and X are carefully edited and adequate footnotes are added to provide references. In the later books proper names are rendered in the form used by Diodorus; these sometimes appear strange, e.g. Cherronesus, Pleistonax, and Melians, and it would perhaps be better to use more orthodox forms and avoid the necessity for such a footnote as occurs on p. 126 explaining that the 'Melians' are inhabitants of Malis. The geographical notes are particularly good and they are well sup-

ported by pull-out maps at the end of the volume; in the second of these it is a pity that the dotted line used to indicate the ancient coast-line is so similar to that indicating modern paths. In Books XI and XII, where so much invites comment, Oldfather's restraint is laudable and his notes are concise and to the point. Sometimes further references might be given where points are in dispute; for example, on p. 383 the footnote dealing with the Peace of Calias would be improved by reference to Wade-Gery's article in *Harvard Studies*, Supp. I Vol. i (1940). The printing is excellent; the only errors I noticed for correction in a later edition are p. 266, n. 2 τϵ for τε, and p. 283, l. 5 'victorius' for 'victorious'. Gratitude is due to Professor Oldfather and to the Loeb editors for another fine volume.

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### LUCRETIUS

Titī Lucreti Cari *De Rerum Natura Libri Sex*. Edited with Prolegomena, Critical Apparatus, Translation, and Commentary by Cyril BAILEY. 3 vols. Pp. ix+581, 593, 606. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947. Cloth, 84s. net.

MUCH work has been done on Lucretius and Epicurus since Munro's time, and a new commentary has long been needed. Nothing could be more satisfactory than that it should be from the hand of Dr. Cyril Bailey, who published his first text of L. all but fifty years ago, and that the Oxford Press should have been able to devote to it so large a tonnage of paper.

The nature of an editor's task has changed since the days of the great pioneers of the nineteenth century who trod *loca nullius ante trita solo*: there is

less scope for the sometimes arbitrary brilliance of a Munro or the enthusiastic, but excessive, ingenuity of a Giussani. Balanced judgement and lucid exposition are demanded from an editor of L. to-day rather than more spectacular qualities, and B. has succeeded admirably in bringing together and presenting all that contemporary knowledge can contribute to the solution of the problems which face the student of L. If a fault is to be found it is that in his anxiety to do justice to all he has procured the survival of a number of things over which Oblivion need not have been discouraged from scattering her poppy.

Vol. i contains 170 pages of Prolegomena, in which are discussed L.'s life and the structure of the poem, manu-

scripts and editions, grammar, metre, and style, and the text of the poem with translation facing; vol. ii the commentary on Books I-III; vol. iii the rest of the commentary, a translation of an Arabic version of part of a meteorological work of Theophrastus as appendix to Book VI, addenda consisting largely of references to Bignone's *Storia della Letteratura Latina*, and indexes and bibliography. The commentary, with nearly 200 pages to a Book, might seem unduly long; actually each section is preceded by a full analysis of the contents and a discussion of the sources, subject-matter, and connexion of thought which occupies nearly a third of the whole. Some of these discussions might as well, or better, have been placed in the Prolegomena; thus on p. 31 we read that the poem falls naturally into three groups of two books, on p. 1131, in the commentary on Book III, that this book is the culmination of the first part of the poem; both statements are true, but they need bringing together. In the commentary on v. 148 B. ignores his own account of the Epicurean gods in Prolegomena iv. 15-16.

The *apparatus criticus* is much fuller than that of the last Oxford text, but briefer than that of Diels. Three correctors are distinguished for Oblongus and two for Quadratus; the Gottorp and Vienna *schedae* are frequently, though irregularly, mentioned. Those whose main concern is with the text will still go to Diels; for others this apparatus is perhaps more than adequate.

The Oxford text of 1921 was called conservative; now, the editor tells us, the reading of the manuscripts has been restored in ninety-one further places. In this respect fashion has moved in B.'s direction in the last twenty years, but in his orthography he remains unconventionally conventional; he admits *donique* for *donec*, *ahenae*, a few nominatives in *os* instead of *or*, and ablatives in *i* where Cicero would have written *e*, but except for *vocaret* in place of *vacaret*, which goes back to Munro, he firmly refuses to tease the unsuspecting reader with archaic quaintnesses. Two principles seem to have guided him in

constructing his text: one that Latin at this date was still more flexible and less standardized in its syntax than is often assumed, the other that L. did not attempt such a logical development of his argument as the older editors demanded and tried to extract by unlimited bracketing and transposition: not only was ancient philosophical writing less rigid in its arrangement, but L., as Büchner has shown, is peculiarly apt to be led by a diverging train of thought into a parenthesis, and then to return without warning to his original theme. There can be no doubt that this is true and important.

A typical example of the editorial 'improvement' which B. now rejects is afforded by i. 473 *Tyndaridis forma conflatus amore*, where *formae* or *amoris* has commonly been read. Similarly, he has returned to the manuscripts at i. 240 *nexus* for *nexu*, ii. 159 *unum* for *una*, iv. 395 *videtur* after a double subject, iv. 755 *leonum* for *leonem*, v. 359 *sit* for *fit*; copula *est* is no longer restored at i. 111 *poenas in morte timendum* and in similar passages. It is probably true that earlier critics thought of language too much in terms of rules, but there is a limit to the degree of anomaly which is credible, and it is a question whether some of B.'s vindications of the manuscripts do not overstep it. i. 555 *summum aetatis pervadere finem* without *ad* or *in*: *pervadere* should mean 'go through', not 'reach', and Accius' *sonitusne inferum pervasit aures* is no true parallel; iii. 172 *terraeque petitus suavis* (also the reading of the Oxford text): it may be true that 'the moment of swooning is felt to be pleasant', but hardly swooning caused by 'the shuddering shock of a weapon laying bare bones and sinews'; v. 571 *fulgent* in a transitive sense (*mulcent* Lachmann); vi. 453 *modis exiguis*, 'lightly' connected (*moris* Lachmann); vi. 864 *roriferis undis*, 'waves of night' (*umbris* Marullus; *aeris undas*, ii. 252 quoted in defence is much easier)—all these are very difficult; still more so is i. 190, where *crescentes* is allowed to agree with *omnia* on the ground that L. often confuses *res* and the neuter and that *crescentes* is equivalent to *res*

*crescentes*, though the nearest *res* is six lines away; Munro's animadversions on Wakefield, who took this view, seem not unjustified.

A striking feature of this text as compared with the Oxford text is the number of places where an obelus has been removed; in a number of cases B. has decided that the manuscript reading can be stretched to the required meaning, e.g. at ii. 250, iii. 83, and vi. 778; these may well be right, but other examples are less credible; at iii. 658 *serpentis utrumque* has to mean 'both parts of a snake', and iv. 546 *retro cita* 'echoed back' is very difficult. But there is also a greater readiness to admit emendation rather than leave a passage meaningless; at the well-known crux ii. 42 he prints Munro's *ecum vi*, but transposes 42 and 43, which gives a slight improvement; Munro is allowed to rescue several other passages previously despaired of, ii. 515 and 529 and v. 312.

B. admits a few emendations of his own. i. 289 *ruitque et quidquid*, ii. 356 *quaerit*, vi. 49 *furerent* are promoted from the apparatus of the Oxford text. At ii. 252 *motu* is a better supplement than the traditional *semper*, since it accounts for the corruption, and at vi. 83 *terrae* than *species*, though the *caeli terraeque* of the Barberinus, on which it is based, carries no authority. At i. 744 *imbrem* for *ignem* is likely to win acceptance. At the crux vi. 550 *ea ubi lapi* is printed, which is changed in the addenda to *ipsa ut lapi*; but the bouncing of wagons is rather unimpressive after the trembling of houses, and throws little light on what has gone before.

The problem of transpositions is of peculiar importance for the editor of L. On the one hand, the disjointed style reflects something in L.'s natural mode of thought and it is a mistake to improve it by rearrangement. On the other, such a passage as iv. 26-53, now restored to the original order, shows that whoever prepared L.'s work for publication took a very restricted view of an editor's duties, and it is surprising if this is the only place where alternative versions have been left side by side. B.'s practice is to bracket only such certainly

misplaced lines as v. 574, and in cases of suspicion to give a word of warning in the commentary. This is generally the best course, but there is a strong case for bracketing i. 50-61; it is obviously a passage of transition from proem to exposition, as has been pointed out often enough, and alternative to 127-35, 146-58; never would L. have ended an important verse period inside the proem with such a broken-backed line as *corpora prima, quod ex illis sunt omnia primis*, and its presence unbracketed is a blemish. 44-9 are also printed unbracketed, which is the modern fashion, though the 'learned interpolator' is quite as likely to have been at work here as at iii. 474 and at vi. 56.

The translation is substantially the same as that printed in 1921, a version of proved usefulness, which never rises as high as Munro's but reads much more like English in ordinary exposition. Those who have been perplexed by 'the everlasting groove of time' at v. 1216—at i. 1004 the same words are rendered 'tract of time'—will be encouraged by a certain addiction to Tennyson in the Commentary to conclude that we have an echo of 'the ringing grooves of change' in Locksley Hall. This line was written on the assumption that railway trains ran in grooves, an inaccuracy of which L. would not have been guilty.

The Commentary is generally admirable; with the aid especially of Giussani, Robin, and his own earlier work B. expounds the difficulties with clarity and suggests solutions without dogmatism. L. is made as far as possible to illustrate himself; the Commentary is not burdened with all the traditional quotations, but reference is made to Munro for those who want further parallels. Possible criticisms are that there is a certain amount of chat about text and manuscripts which will interest few readers before the next editor, and that the treatment of some subjects is unduly restricted. Little, for instance, is said about the implications of the account of the development of human society in Book V; Aeschylus' description of primitive life in the *Prometheus*,



however familiar, is worth referring to, and the traces of the inconsistent conception of a Golden Age at v. 1006 ff. should be pointed out. On the other hand, the ghostly atom of modern physics is better not mentioned in connexion with the *clinamen*, unless with words of warning which are lacking on p. 842. The statement that the poem is in the form of a Greek hymn could have been expanded with profit, or at least a reference given in this connexion to Diels's article. A few minor points: p. 908 and Prolegomena 158 *pārent . . . pārentibus* has no obvious relevance to the text of ii. 643; p. 1132, 'L. nowhere touches on the feeling of some that death is a relief from the ills of this life': he does so at iii. 905; iv. 1200 and 1270 'shuns' does not make sense of *laeta retractat*: as there seems to be no parallel for Munro's 'draws in' it is best to take the *re* as repetitive, of renewing a familiar pleasure; v. 1267 Marullus' emendation is wrongly given in the commentary, though not in the text, as *dolare ac* instead of *et*, and Housman's emendation as *valeret* instead of *valerent*; pp. 1688-9, there seems no authority for the form *Aradum* as well as *Aradus*. The entry in the addenda to iv. 779 appears to have fallen out.

In the Prolegomena a surprising amount of the research of the last fifty years has been gathered in. As to L.'s date, thanks to Sandbach's investigations, there is even less that is definite than in the older books. With regard to the love-philtre it should be stated categorically that it could not cause madness—death likely enough. The Borgia life is treated by B. with more geniality than by most critics. L.'s main source is assumed, as usual, to have been the *Μεγάλη Ἐπιτομή*, an assumption which by force of repetition grows into a fact

in the commentary; it is curious that scholars are so reluctant to allow L. to use the *Περὶ Φύσεως* from which he borrowed the title (p. 583) and from which he may have borrowed much else: i. 410-17 suggests a wide acquaintanceship with Epicurean literature. The section on manuscripts and editions is admirably clear, and the views of B. on his predecessors are full of interest; Diels gets the credit which has not always been accorded him in this country. Epicurean *Canonice*, ethics, and theology are discussed, the physics being left to emerge from the poem. The most notable parts of the Prolegomena are those dealing with metre, prosody, and style. The first does for L. much of what Norden's edition of *Aeneid* vi did for the study of Virgil's hexameter. L.'s practice with regard to clash, coincidence, and pause in each foot is tabulated and compared with that of Ennius, Cicero, and Virgil; though it could be deduced from the tables, the absence of spondaic endings from Book VI is strangely not mentioned, nor does B. reserve the term bucolic diaeresis, as is desirable, for places where there is some sense-pause after the 4th foot. It is a pity the study was not carried beyond enjambment to the consideration of verse periods. The treatment of style is somewhat austere; perhaps Prolegomena are no place in which to let oneself go. Vocabulary, figures of speech, alliteration, repetition of words, syllables, and passages are examined with copious examples, and if this is not the last word that need be written on L.'s style, whoever writes it is likely to be heavily indebted to the material here supplied.

Few works come from the press with the assurance of so long and useful a life as this.

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#### LATIN MANUSCRIPTS IN ITALY

E. A. LOWE: *Codices Latini Antiquiores*. A Palaeographical Guide to Latin Manuscripts prior to the ninth century. Part IV, *Italy: Perugia-Verona*. Pp. xxviii+40; 31 plates, four specimens on each. Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1947. Cloth and boards, 70s.

THE earlier parts of this great work were reviewed: I (Vatican) *C.R.* xlix, 1934, p. 189; II (Great Britain and Ireland) li, 1936, p. 146; III (Italy, Ancona-

Novara) liv, 1939, p. 135. Here we have the rest of Italy, including Rome outside the Vatican, so the author can review Italy as a whole. It must be borne in mind that we are only concerned with books earlier than A.D. 800. There are about 371 such items in Italy (all numbers are approximate) and 284 of them are of Italian origin, 87 being foreigners. There must be many Italian manuscripts abroad, even of these early ones; we have about thirty in our islands.

If we classify by scripts, this part contains four pieces in capital, 73 uncials (16 early), 24 half-uncials, 13 in quarter-uncial and formed minuscule, 5 cursive, 2 Caroline, and 6 insular. Only in Italy would you get so many uncials and 'Roman' half-uncials; scribes trained in uncial were still supplying by far the greater part of books right down to the Caroline invasion; north of the Alps there was much more stimulus to form convenient book-hands. In the north of Italy they were just coming in when Caroline swamped them, but of course in the south they held their own in Beneventan.

For classical scholars this Part IV is very disappointing: of its 117 items there are only 8 classical pieces surviving—No. 417 (Rome) hardly counts, having been written at Lyons about 800; it contains Porphyry's *Isagoge*, Aristotle's *Categories*, some Apuleius and Boethius; 421 (Rome) has bits of Pliny, *N.H.* xxiii–xxv, in fifth-century uncial; 450 (Turin) is two uncial leaves of Boethius; 498 (Verona), 51 ll. of Virgil in fifth-century rustic; 499 (Verona), 60 ll. of Livy in fifth-century uncial, is important; Lowe remarks that all early Livies, this, Paris, Vienna, Lateran, Bamberg, are in the same type of uncial and of the same date; only Palatinus (*C.L.A.* i. 75) is rustic (fourth century). From the same book as 499 came bits of a Latin Euclid (501) in fifth-century rustic. Last, as is fitting, come selections from Claudian (516) in a queer local minuscule.

Four Bobbio palimpsests, 439 (Julius Valerius, in cursive minuscule over uncial *Cod. Theodos.*), 442 (90 leaves of Cicero in rustic), 443 two leaves of *ad*

*Fam.* in uncial, 445 a rustic leaf of *in Verrem*, are lost, but not all record of them has perished; they were burnt in the Turin fire of 1904. Well do I remember F. C. Burkitt announcing this disaster to his class; it destroyed twelve items worthy to figure in this book and I know not how many later manuscripts: men saved what stood nearest the door, and did not reach all the more precious but so less accessible books.

Besides the classical fragments we have 7 law books, 2 on grammar, 27 biblical, 67 patristic, and 4 liturgical. By far the most important are the biblical; *C.L.A.* iii and iv between them exhibit all the chief authorities for the Old Latin text of the Gospels: *a*, Vercellensis; *b*, Veronensis; *c*, Palatinus (now back at Trent); *f*, Brixianus; *i*, Vindobonensis (now back at Naples); *j*, Saretianus (now back at Sarrezano near Tortona); *k*, Bobiensis at Turin; *M* and *S* at Milan; *s* of the Acts, Bobiensis (back at Naples): with them go manuscripts of Cyprian and Hilary.

In his Introduction Lowe passes in review the logical grounds for the dates he assigns to manuscripts, and makes little lists of those upon which his reasoning is based, e.g. p. xiii, six manuscripts corrected at a given place, some at a given time, then those whose contents suggest a given region, including in these the north Italian manuscripts with remains of Gothic (i. 26 *b*, *c*; iii. 344 *b*, 351, 364, 365; see p. xxiv) or with Arian matter (i. 31, iii. 315, iv. 504).

To our view of how rustic developed he gives the grounds on p. xiv; the dates that help us for uncial he marshals on p. xv; half-uncial he discusses on p. xvi, as also the *bd* sloping uncial and his 'quarter-uncial' which dates from before the foundation of Bobbio and is close to the ancestor of insular cursive. Then (p. xvii) he assembles the marginalia in sloping uncials and half-uncials in fifth- and sixth-century manuscripts, and deals with the rather scattered attempts to mould a minuscule book-hand, always encumbered with ligatures. Finally, he discusses the foreign influences to which Italian writing-schools were exposed.

So Lowe comes, p. xix, to what must have most attracted him in his subject, the two pre-Caroline schools of which we have real remains, the Veronese with about fifty manuscripts, and the Bobbiese with a hundred. The Chapter Library of Verona, rediscovered by Sc. Maffei in the eighteenth century, he calls 'the queen of ecclesiastical collections': Traube thought it *fast völlig autochthon*: this seems probable, but proof is rather meagre, and it is difficult to see any common internal characteristics marking manuscripts as Veronese.

Would that Bobbio had also lain hidden: its hundred *antiquiores* are widely scattered, even parts of the same book; Rome has 25 items, Naples 8 most important pieces brought back from Vienna, Milan 29, and 16 are now, or were formerly, at Turin, perhaps one at Paris, and one at Wolfenbüttel; we can hardly count the Medicean Virgil, which had been a stray at Bobbio but illustrates the fact that books much older than the monastery found their way to it—some of them already mutilated, and some perhaps already palimpsests (p. xxv). Bobbio is not guilty of all palimpsests; they come from Verona and many other places, even from France. These old books give no grounds at all for accepting Beer's idea that any of them came from the Vivarium at the other end of Italy; nor does Lowe accept Steffens's view that the insular abbreviations were selected at Bobbio: they were clearly part of the Irish importation (p. xxiv). The most instructive manuscript is the Hieronymus in *Isaiam* (iii. 365) marked 'Lb de arca domno atalani', the second abbot, who died in 622: written in a clumsy half-uncial, one page in Irish script, upon parchment used before (for Ulfilas), and with very crude decoration, it shows the poverty and helplessness of the early years.

Lowe (p. xxi) establishes a group of nine early manuscripts in half-uncial; five of them have uncial as well and lead on to another list of eleven regular uncials. The varieties of cursive are very great; not all need be Bobbiese; some date from before the foundation. The Irish script (p. xxiii) goes back to the

seventh, perhaps almost to the sixth, century, as iii. 312, 328 cannot be very far removed from Columba's *Cumdach* (ii. 266), traditionally dated to 561. It was supported by fresh recruits and by gifts of manuscripts from Ireland, such as the Antiphoner of Bangor or the Turin Gospels, and survived till the eighth century. How much easier would all this piecing together have been had Bobbio survived, like Monte Cassino till the other day, as the home of its marvellous library and a monument to the wonderful enterprise of the Irish monks. The learned world has had to wait for Lowe to make all these things plain for us: no one else has been able to do it.

Next we expect the volume on France, which will give him occasion to clear up the development of minuscule culminating in Caroline.

The war delayed the appearance of this volume, but the Clarendon Press has contrived to make it in every way the equal of its predecessors.

To *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati* vi, (*Studi e Testi*, No. 126) published by the Vatican Library in 1946, Dr. Lowe has contributed an article on 'Omission-signs in Latin Manuscripts, their Origin and Significance', (pp. 44, pl. 8) a natural *πάρεργον* of his great work.

When the omission of a piece of text is discovered in a manuscript the addendum is written either between the lines with a caret-mark or in the margin, at the side opposite the place where it ought to go, at the top, or, most frequently, at the bottom of the page. The place is indicated by some sign and the addendum is also given a sign: these signs have mostly been misread in later times; here we have their proper interpretation established and their varieties classified, so that they may throw light on the place and date of the manuscripts in which they are used.

The Greek practice, if the addendum is written at the bottom, is to put by it *ἄνω* or an arrow pointing downwards and at the place *κάτω* or an arrow pointing up. If the addendum is written above, the signs are reversed. The arrow points just opposite to the way I

should naturally make it: in very early Latin manuscripts the arrow is used in just the same way. Codex Bezae shows it well in both Greek and Latin. In Italy arrows were superseded by **hd** at the place and **hs** beside the addendum (either to right or left of it) if it is in the lower margin; **hs** at the place and **hd** beside the addendum if it is in the top margin. Lowe suggests that these letters stand for *hic deorsum*, 'here look downwards' (to see what should be inserted, or where this should go) and *hic sursum*, exactly corresponding to *κάτω* and *άνω*. This reading is supported by occasional fuller forms such as **hssu**, **hds**, **hic** . . . **hs**. (I make no attempt to indicate the form of the letters and I leave out the tittle.) **s** may stand for *super* as we find **SR**, **SUR**, **SPR** as well as **SRS**: **hp** may mean *hic pone* = 'here look back'; 'put it here' does not fit.

Sometimes asterisks and obeli call attention.

Visigothic is apt to use **dh** or **Ih** (*infra hic*), and so manuscripts influenced by it.

So we dispose of the customary interpretations *hoc supple*, *hoc scribe*, *hic deest*, *hic deficit*, *hic ponas*. Usage, however, becomes irregular and scribes, like us moderns, have failed to understand the locative meaning, so sometimes *hic deest* or *hoc supple* may be right.

Insular practice shows no locative meaning; **d** in the text refers to **h** in any margin, perhaps *deest* and *hoc*.

I wonder whether **h** used in the text may not mean *hinc*, 'look from here upwards' or 'downwards'. I feel the idea of motion comes in.

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#### WORDS OF SPEAKING IN GREEK

H. FOURNIER: *Les Verbes 'dire' en grec ancien*. Pp. xii+234. Paris: Klincksieck, 1946. Paper, 600 fr.

THIS work pursues a subject treated by C. D. Buck in 'Words of Speaking and Saying in Indo-European languages' (*A.J.P.*, 1915, pp. 1-18, 125-54), reviewed by A. Meillet in *B.S.L.*, fasc. 64, p. 28. The chief problems here discussed are the post-Homeric displacement of *φημί* by *λέγω* as the normal present of *εἰπεῖν*, the history of *λέγω*, the force of *φημί* in its limited Attic use, and the points of semantic community and individuality in the elements of the Attic tense-system *λέγω-ἔρω-εἶπον-εἶρηκα*. The contents comprise four parts, viz. on the relations (1) of *φημί*, (2) of Homeric *ἀγορεύω* and some other verbs, and (3) of *λέγω* to *εἰπεῖν* / *εἶρεῖν*, and (4) on *ἔπος*, *μῦθος*, *λόγος*, and certain other nouns relating to speech.

Not all will accept (and the author expressly admits that some authorities have not accepted) the respectably supported view which he adopts of the etymology of *φημί*, connecting it with *\*bhā*, 'shine'. But the value of this work consists not in such conjectures, but in its careful examination of the

actual use of these verbs in Greek literature. Besides tense-time, two other characteristics are relevant in this inquiry. The first the author names 'subjective' or 'objective': e.g. in *φημί νοστήσειν*, *φημί* is 'subjective'; the notion of belief or opinion is prominent; *εἶπον*, stating only the utterance of certain words, is 'objective'. The other characteristic is aspect, in Meillet's terminology 'indeterminate' or 'determinate', the semantic quality which, apart from any question of tense-time or of continuance of activity, distinguishes, e.g., *ὄρω* from *κατέιδον*, or *I urge* from *I convince*. The determinate aspect is clear in *εἴρηται*, it is *ordained* or *agreed*, in a sense corresponding to the noun *ῥήτρα*, and in *ἔρέω* signifying *ἀπαγγελλῶ*.

The early 'subjective' force of *φημί* is preserved in some characteristic Homeric (and later) constructions. Homer never uses it absolutely (unless with the author we admit the formula in *Il.* i. 187 and its three variants elsewhere as exceptions). Apart from the Attic parenthetical use in quoted speech and the Homeric use of *ὦς φάτο*, etc., after such speech, *φημί* in construction remains



akin to verbs of thinking in taking the accusative and infinitive, not  $\delta\tau\iota$ : on the other hand, after  $\epsilon\iota\pi\epsilon\iota\nu$  this infinitive construction occurs only three times in Homer and is hardly less rare in later Greek.

The influence of  $\epsilon\iota\pi\epsilon\iota\nu$  /  $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\nu$  on  $\phi\eta\mu\acute{\iota}$  in the formulaic diction of Homer works on the lines so brilliantly traced by Milman Parry in his *Épithète traditionnelle dans Homère*. In the formulae introducing or dismissing quoted speech (e.g.  $\epsilon\pi\omicron\varsigma\ \tau'\ \epsilon\phi\alpha\tau'$  . . . ,  $\phi\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\ \mu\acute{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\nu$ , or  $\omega\varsigma\ \alpha\bar{\rho}\ \epsilon\phi\eta$ ) the present of  $\phi\eta\mu\acute{\iota}$  does not occur: the reason for  $\omega\varsigma\ \phi\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron$  (used 490 times in a total of 594 formulaic occurrences of preterite forms from  $\phi\eta\mu\acute{\iota}$ ,  $\epsilon\pi\omicron\varsigma\ \tau'\ \epsilon\phi\alpha\tau'$  . . . accounting for another 45), and the like, is simply metrical convenience, in lines where  $\omega\varsigma\ \epsilon\iota\pi\epsilon\nu$ , etc., would not fit; and the semantic leveling has gone so far in Homer that  $\phi\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron$ ,  $\epsilon\phi\eta$ , etc., probably imperfect (and indeterminate and subjective) in origin, have in these formulae become nothing else but metrical variants of the same meaning as  $\epsilon\iota\pi\epsilon\nu$ . Prose, not having the same need for such metrical variants,

almost entirely drops  $\phi\eta\mu\acute{\iota}$  in this use and develops the parenthetic use—unknown to Homer—of  $\epsilon\phi\eta$ , *inquit*, a use in which some of the old imperfect force is preserved.

No less valuable is the treatment of  $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$  and its relation to  $\epsilon\iota\pi\epsilon\iota\nu$  /  $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\nu$ , pp. 53–209, showing in detail how in inflexion, in 'objective' meaning, in semantic development (here Bréal, 'Les verbes signifiant "parler"', *R.É.G.* 1901, p. 113, is effectively quoted), and in syntax,  $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega$  became the equivalent present for  $\epsilon\iota\pi\omicron\nu$ . The elaborate and exhaustive investigations and classifications of meanings and constructions in post-Homeric Greek, including an acute analysis of *Oratio Obliqua*, cannot here be fairly or clearly summarized; but the book can be confidently recommended to all interested in the subject with which it deals. It remains only to congratulate the author and the school of linguistics to which he belongs on the production in the conditions of these days of a work so creditable to both.

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### THE LATIN SUBJUNCTIVE

S. A. HANDFORD: *The Latin Subjunctive, its Usage and Development from Plautus to Tacitus*. Pp. 184. London: Methuen, 1947. Cloth, 10s. 6d. net.

THIS book is a welcome sign of a revival in this country of a specialistic interest in that side of Latin studies without some knowledge of which literary appreciation is impossible. Those scholars are very few whose instinctive grasp of language is such that they can attain to literary appreciation without consciously applying themselves to the study of syntax. For those of us who have to arrive by the hard way Mr. Handford has performed a scholarly and useful service. Now that the study of Latin in schools is begun at a much later age than formerly, it is necessary to appeal to the reason as well as to the memory of the student by presenting the syntax in a reasoned historical account, instead of in a series of disconnected rules. This concise historical account of the sub-

junctive will be a great help to teachers and advanced students.

After an introduction on the general problem of the Latin subjunctive and a discussion of the theories held by the chief modern authorities, a few sections are devoted to showing how subordinate clauses developed out of parataxis. The rest of the book is divided into two parts of unequal length. Part I contains a classification of the independent uses of the mood, and after each are described the dependent uses which are conceived to have developed from it. The uses described in Part I are those of which H. believes the modal force and the derivation to be reasonably clear. Part II is reserved for dependent uses of which the origin is not clear, or which may be set down to analogical extension, wherein the modal force of the subjunctive is weakened or non-existent.

There is a useful discussion of the views of Delbrück and his 'unitarian'

opponents Oertel, Morris, Sonnenschein, and Kroll. The introduction ends with a modified acceptance of the view of Delbrück that the Latin subjunctive did inherit from the parent language some of its meanings together with optative as well as subjunctive forms. The author rightly points to the difficulty of deriving all existing usages from one original meaning. The usual classification of independent uses into expressions of will, wish, deliberative questions, and potentiality is adopted, but rightly without reference to the division of functions between the subjunctive and optative in Greek.

When he is dealing with the independent subjunctive, the soundness of the author's judgement cannot be contested. But when we come to his account of subordinate developments, we find that he has, after all, adopted exclusively the views of the German school of grammarians represented by Dittmar, Schmalz-Hofmann, and Kroll. Apart from the few types of subordinate subjunctive that are clearly connected with the independent subjunctive of wish, we find that all other types are derived directly or indirectly from the jussive, including consecutive clauses and causal, adversative, and generic *qui*-clauses, though it is admitted that the latter may be of composite origin, and they appear again in Part II. Although the potential subjunctive is often enough recognizable in relative clauses, it is not allowed to have had any secondary subordinate developments at all. The views of the American school of thought, as represented by Hale and Bennett, are too briefly discussed and too lightly dismissed (§ 113).

In a book which is likely to be used, and, indeed, deserves to be used, as a text-book for specialist students, the outstanding landmarks should be consistently kept in view, to which the student may raise his eyes, when he feels himself getting lost in the forest of particular developments. The first incontestable fact about the Latin subjunctive is that, whatever inherited forms are embedded in it, it was already regarded as a single mood at the earliest

period to which our records go back. The second fact is that already then it could be used to express towards an event or situation at least three attitudes of mind that seem to be logically distinct. To try to argue any of them out of existence, as Kroll did, is futile, when everyone who can read Latin knows very well that they do exist. It is equally futile to try to explain away two of them as having been evolved out of the third during the lifetime of Latin itself, when the need to express them all must be almost as old as human thought, or at any rate older than the emergence of Latin. Cannot any sound deductions be made from these facts to serve investigators as a guide in tracing particular developments? The author apparently disagrees with investigators who have sought to find the unity of the Latin subjunctive in its meaning, for in §§ 106-9 he effectively disposes of the arguments of Kroll. He seems to catch a glimpse of the truth in § 154, but, as already indicated, he loses sight of it in his treatment of subordinate developments; for to try to derive every subordinate development ultimately from the jussive seems to argue belief in an original unity of meaning and in a single line of development. If the potential sense was original and distinct from the jussive, why could not it also have had subordinate developments? This inconsistency makes some sections of Part I puzzling, and renders Part II the least enlightening part of the book.

To the reviewer it seems necessary to revive in some modified form the view that the unity of the Latin subjunctive is not to be sought in any one original meaning, but in its general function. The moulders of the Latin language must have felt instinctively that there was something common to expressions of will, wish, and of opinion as to possibility, which marked them all off from statements of undigested fact. Or, to put it another way, they may not have been subtle enough to feel that these distinctions mattered. Otherwise they could not have come to regard the forms they used for these expressions as be-

longing to a single mood. This common factor surely lies in the fact that any independent subjunctive, whatever particular 'attitude' it expresses, denotes that the speaker has *reflected upon* the action or state about which he is making a communication and that he desires to bring his personal influence to bear in some way. The attitude of mind (or 'mode' or 'mood') resulting from this reflection may be one of controlling will that the action be brought about, of powerless request or desire for it, or of desire to impart a belief that it is fitting, possible, or inevitable. The possible variations in emotional force and the gradations between these main attitudes are infinite. To try to derive one from another is waste of time, because they are all evoked by a particular situation or context, and all existed in the human mind from the beginning. The Latin subjunctive in itself is merely the mood of conscious or reflective thought which produces a desire to instruct, while the indicative is the mood of unreflective observation. The speakers of Latin must have felt that the difference between the various attitudes of mind which they expressed by the subjunctive was one of degree rather than of kind. At the back of every one of them lies the desire to *instruct* and influence the hearer, not simply to provide him with objective data for his own reflection. This must have been what mattered most to the Romans; otherwise they would have felt the need to keep more than one set of mood-forms in use, as the Greeks did, and as the ancient Hindus did at first.<sup>1</sup> If the difference is one of degree, there is no wonder that it is often difficult to nail down some examples of the subjunctive to a particular one of our usual grammar-book categories, to say, for instance, whether *Quis arbitretur?* is 'deliberative' or 'potential'. The various types merge into one another and are not distinct. There is a point at which the idea of will merges into an expression of opinion as to obligation, necessity, desirability,

probability, or mere possibility. It is somewhere about that point that the negative changes from *ne* to *non*.

If the subjunctive was used when the speaker was making a communication about an event as pronounced upon by himself, *a fortiori* it had to be used when he was reporting an event indirectly as pronounced upon by someone else. In final clauses, for instance, the subjunctive reports or quotes the will of someone other than the speaker or writer. From this it was but a short step, and a step which is completed under our very eyes in the course of a generation or so of Latin literature, for the use of the subjunctive to be extended as a convenient way of showing when anything stated or asked in a finite subordinate clause is part of an indirect quotation, and that it does not represent the speaker's own will, views, or observation. It is most important that the development of this secondary modal force should be distinguished from the original direct modal force, whereby the subjunctive implies reflection on the part of the speaker or writer himself.

When a word-form acquires a secondary force, it is well known that its primary force does not necessarily become obsolete, but both may continue side by side in a parallel course of development. For example, when the accusative case acquired a grammatical function, its original adverbial uses not only remained but had further developments. Therefore those grammarians are likely to be wrong who regard every subordinate use of the subjunctive as a stage in a single line of development. In consecutive clauses of all types, and in generic, causal, and adversative clauses, the subjunctive reflects the thought of the speaker or writer himself, who thereby indicates that he has made a connexion in his own mind between what is stated in the main clause and what is stated in the subordinate clause. The subjunctive in these clauses, therefore, is more likely to be a separate development, starting from a different point on the scale of independent uses, than merely a branching-off or tertiary

<sup>1</sup> The absorption of the functions of the subjunctive by the optative in later Sanskrit is a development parallel to that of Latin.

development from the use in final clauses.

There are other reasons for thinking that the views of the Hale-Bennett school deserve greater consideration than they have received in this book. It is highly unlikely that a legally minded people like the Romans confused intended with unintended result to such an extent that they could not express the latter in a subordinate clause, until 'the idea of intention came to be superseded by that of accomplishment' (§ 51). Nor is it likely that the negative changed from *ne* to *non* at that late stage. The negative in consecutive clauses is *non*, because they express direct opinion, and not indirect will. The fact that also an independent subjunctive which reflects opinion rather than will is negated by *non* must not be overlooked in seeking the origin of subordinate subjunctives which are negated by *non*.

Investigators who trace back all consecutive and generic clauses ultimately to the jussive are able to build up a strong case for several reasons. Final and consecutive clauses may be the same in form and only distinguishable by their context. When both the main and the subordinate verbs are in the first person, 'indirectness' is obscured, though it may still exist.<sup>1</sup> There are many examples in which it is impossible to determine whether the subjunctive is final or consecutive. In certain types of *ut*-clause the negative varies between *ne* and *non*. Finally, it is easy to find examples of ideas expressed forcefully and rhetorically by independent jussives or deliberatives which look like, and may well be, the paratactic originals of certain types of consecutive clause. But similarity of form is no evidence of a common origin. How could final and consecutive clauses help looking alike, when the subjunctive had come to be used in both, and the connecting word had to be a relative pronoun or adverb? Whatever the origin of the subjunctive

in consecutive clauses of fact, situations often arise in which a narrator may express a result in a subordinate clause either from the point of view of a character in the narrative, in which case the subjunctive is 'final' and of jussive origin, or else from his own point of view, in which case he is expressing his own opinion of the connexion of cause and effect, and the subjunctive is not 'final' and need not be either an extension of the final use or of jussive origin at all. A clever stylist may deliberately exploit this double possibility, as Tacitus undoubtedly does in examples like *Germ.* 29 '... in eas sedes transgressus in quibus pars Romani imperii fierent'. Whether Tacitus is pointing to a connexion in his own mind between the choice of this particular abode and its result, or whether he is hinting at the working out of the purpose of some higher power, who can tell? It is the possibility of these alternative points of view which accounts for the alternation of *ut ne* and *ut non* in stipulative clauses. In these and other idiomatic uses of the *ut*-clause, dealt with in §§ 35, 52-4, and 58, the author takes the presence of *ne* in some to prove the jussive origin of all. It does nothing of the sort.

To trace back with certainty to a paratactic jussive or deliberative origin any subordinate use of the subjunctive that is not clearly indirect is difficult, because the emotional force of the strongest jussive or most rhetorical deliberative must of necessity evaporate the moment it is subordinated. How, then, can we be sure, as the author seems to be in § 99, that a consecutive relative clause of the type 'Antonius non is est qui pareat' developed directly out of a parataxis such as Cic. *Phil.* vi. 5 'huic ille denuntiationi pareat? ... non is est Antonius'. Such deliberatives are followed by a strong denial, and it is necessary to postulate purely formal extension to account for the common use of the consecutive subjunctive after positive antecedents ('multi sunt qui abripiant', 'eum consulem habetis qui non dubitet'). In a similar way Schmalzhofmann (p. 760), in seeking the paratactic original of the consecutive

<sup>1</sup> e.g. *cadam ut crus frangam* is logically distinct from *redibo ut me purgem*. The former is a direct expression of opinion as to possibility. The latter is a willed result, and the speaker is quoting himself.



*ut*-clause, appeal to Cic. *T.D.* iii. 71 'quis est tam demens ut sua voluntate maereat?' (presumably from 'ut sua v. maereat? quis est tam demens?'), but ignore a parataxis such as Cic. *Verr.* iv. 31 'canes venaticos diceret—it odorabantur omnia et pervestigabant'. It is remarkable to what extent grammarians who ignore the independent potential as a possible source of subordinate developments are forced back on analogical extension and attraction for their explanations. There are some subordinate developments, e.g. the subjunctive in *cum*-clauses and in frequentative clauses, which baffle them completely.

It is true enough that formal extension plays an important part in the development of syntax, as the author points out several times. It is also true, as he points out on p. 30, that such extensions usually begin from particular idioms, restricted at first to a limited range. So a grain of mustard seed grows into a large plant, but not unless conditions of climate and soil are favourable. Formal extension must not be dragged in as a *deus ex machina*, since it operates only when the psychological background is favourable. A good example is provided by the development of the subjunctive in repudiating questions, of which a most instructive account is given in §§ 74-99. The author justly complains that this development of the jussive has been strangely neglected in English books on Latin grammar. But if it was responsible for as many subordinate types as he, apparently following Dittmar, maintains, we must suppose that the early Romans went about in a state of perpetual indignation with one another. The quantity of the examples is due to exciting situations in plays, from which the bulk of our earlier evidence comes. Nevertheless, it is reasonably certain that this usage was responsible for the extension of the subjunctive to indirect questions of fact. In examples like Ter. *Ad.* 83 "Quid fecit?" "Quid ille fecerit? quem neque pudet . . .", we can almost understand a governing verb *rogas*? But the subjunctive had already acquired in final clauses the secondary function of

indicating indirect quotation, and its extension not only to all indirect questions, but also to any other type of subordinate clause in *Oratio Obliqua*, was only a matter of time. The change was not entirely due to mechanical extension or assimilation. What the particular idiom of the repudiating subjunctive happened to provide was a convenient starting-point for giving administrative effect, as it were, to a law already sanctioned. Whether the author is right to follow Dittmar in holding it to account for all sorts of consecutive *ut*- and *qui*-clauses, wherein the reflected thought is in no sense indirect, is not so sure. It would be wrong to go to the opposite extreme and deny its influence altogether, but it seems odd that so many 'non-final' subordinate uses of the subjunctive should have developed from interrogative expressions in parataxis. It is true that such an origin would raise no difficulty about the negative *non*, since an interrogative jussive does not express will, nor does it necessarily inquire about the will of someone else. The reply, as often as not, is an expression of *opinion* as to obligation, which may be negated by *non*. But why should not this subjunctive which expresses an opinion as to obligation, necessity, likelihood, etc., itself become subordinated? Its effect in a relative or adverbial clause is bound to be characterizing or descriptive, whether of a person or thing or of an action. The subjunctive in subordination could then develop another secondary function, unconnected with its use in final clauses, for it might come to be used for its descriptive effect alone, even when the action expressed was a fact. In a relative clause that was attributive or parenthetical, the context would usually give it a causal or adversative sense; in relative clauses that were predicative, and in adverbial clauses, it would be bound to express effect or result. There is little doubt that in clauses where it is difficult to decide whether the subjunctive is final or consecutive we have reached a point where different trails converge and intersect. The investigators who rely too much on collecting

examples and compiling tables of statistics, necessary though such work is, are like dogs with their noses to the trail, who never look up to view the wood as a whole and take their bearings. They have wandered on to one of these converging trails in the belief that they are still following a branch of the trail they were on before.

The following comments may be made on points of detail in particular sections:

§ 155 (on sequence of tenses). 'In all those kinds of subord. clause in which the modal force of the subj. remains strong, this principle of sequence is observed . . . with great regularity.' But on H.'s own showing, the modal force of the subjunctive in *rogo te quid faceret* ('what he should have done') is stronger than in *rogo te quid fecerit*.

§ 155 (2). 'The sequence-habit must have been partly responsible for the periphrasis *-urus fuerim*.' Since *fuerim* is so often retained in violation of sequence, this is hardly likely. It is more probably due to the fact that the Romans did not feel that the subjunctive should be forced to perform two different functions at the same time. Those who fail to distinguish between primary and secondary functions, and between different secondary functions, as indicated above, dig many pitfalls for themselves.

§ 159 (2). It is stated that in the type *nemo fuit qui non (quin) audierit* the perfect subjunctive is regular, while in the type *nemo fuit qui temptaret* (where the relative clause does not contain a negative) the imperfect is regular, and that *Verr.* ii. 5. 84 is one of the very few real exceptions. 'The reason for this remarkably consistent difference . . . lies in the different origin of the two types' (i.e. from different types of repudiating question). Even if the author has found the right origin of these clauses, what he says is not true. For other perfectly regular examples of the imperfect, though the relative clause does contain a negative, see *Caes. B.C.* ii. 19. 2; iii. 53. 2 (*nemo fuit quin vulneraretur*); *B.G.* v. 55. 1. The difference in tense depends on the sense required. H. has already revealed in § 157 (2) that he sees no differ-

ence in sense between the perfect and imperfect subjunctive in consecutive clauses. The difference ought to be felt, though, naturally, it cannot be accounted for syntactically by anyone who believes the consecutive to be a mere development of the final.

§ 166 (on sequence in O.O. dependent on a primary introductory verb). 'The subord. verbs. of the O.R., both *indicatives* and *subjunctives* (reviewer's italics), are reproduced with their tenses unchanged; there is no exception to this rule—except . . . that fut. simple is represented by pres. subj.' According to this rule 'homo qui heri in via ambulabat iam mortuus est' becomes 'dicit hominem qui heri in via ambularet iam mortuum esse'. This will be news to most scholars. *ambularet* would have to be a subjunctive of past obligation ('who was to have walked') and would represent *ambularet* of the *Oratio Recta*. In O.O. the progressive action of *ambulabat* cannot be reproduced, unless by a periphrasis, and would normally be neglected. It would be represented by *ambulaverit*. In the examples which are given, in which an imperfect or pluperfect subjunctive does replace an indicative of the O.R., the governing verb is one of those *generalizing* presents (e.g. *aiunt*) which refer as much to the past as to the present. In the example adapted without reference from *pro Flacc.* 44 'dicunt se Flacco et eis qui simul essent (O.R. erant) drachmarum xv milia dedisse', the reference is to statements made some time before, and *dicunt* means in effect *pro testimonio dixerunt*. In such cases historic sequence is common enough.

In spite of the general and particular criticisms made above, this work is not without value. The authorities whom the author follows in his conclusions about subordinate developments enjoy great prestige, and if he errs, he does so in the most authoritative company. But he does not follow them blindly, for there is evidence of hard work and independent thought on every page. It is easier for a critic to be destructive than constructive, as witness Dittmar's devastating attack on Hale. In spite of some

surprising lapses, which will call for serious revision, if the book goes into a second edition, the author is a good scholar, and as he has carefully studied the evidence, it must be conceded that he has a right to his opinion.

The bibliography contains most of the works one would expect, though Allardice's *Syntax of Terence* should accompany Lindsay's *Syntax of Plautus*, and no writer on syntax can afford to neglect Bréal's brilliant *Essai de Séman-tique*, which has a few wise words to say

on the subject of Mood. Juret's *Système de la syntaxe latine* is also missing, and Giuffrida's *Principi di sintassi latina (concetto e funzione del modo)* might be added, for it is not quite as crazy as it seems.

Abbreviations such as 'exx.', 'Gk.', 'subj.', etc., are irritating in a book of this format. On p. 87 we find: 'These are usually expressed . . . by pres. subj. Subj. alone . . . is sufficient.'

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### GREEK FISHES

Sir D'Arcy Wentworth THOMPSON: *A Glossary of Greek Fishes*. Pp. vi+302; 80 figs. London: Oxford University Press, 1947. Cloth, 21s. net.

It is good that Sir D'Arcy Thompson should have been able to follow up his *Glossary of Greek Birds*, of which the second edition was published eleven years ago, with a treatment of Greek Fishes marked by all the qualities the combination of which made his earlier book unique—accurate Greek scholarship, a very thorough knowledge of the natural history of his subject, and familiarity with a wide range of literature, languages, and folk-lore. This is a work which probably no one else could have accomplished—certainly no one could have done it better; and though it may not offer, in addition to its importance for both letters and science, quite so much entertainment as the earlier glossary, this is because fishes are not birds, and fewer fancies have attached themselves to most of them. Students of Roman as well as of Greek fishes will find the book very valuable—with only one drawback, that unless they know the Greek name of the Roman fish in which they are interested they may have some difficulty in finding what they are looking for. Only about half a dozen Latin names of fish come in their alphabetical place in the Glossary; these are names for which there is no exact Greek equivalent; and if a reader wants to know about (e.g.) the *mugil* he must seek what he wants under *κεστρεύς*, if about *torpedo*, under

*νάρκη*, if about *mullus*, under *τρίγλη*, and so on, and he may not know the Greek names of quite common fish. A short list of Latin names with the Greek beside them would have saved some trouble. The scope of the Glossary includes not only fishes in the strict sense, but sponges, coelenterates (sea-anemones, corals, etc.), echinoderms (starfish), mollusca of all kinds (octopuses, cuttlefish, shell-fish, slugs, etc.), crustaceans, and marine mammals (whales and dolphins). The book will be of value not only to readers of Greek literature in general, but especially to students of Comedy, for whom it will help to give reality to the strings of viands which occupy so much space, and to all who are interested in the history of science, biological and medical. Some articles also deserve the careful attention of economic historians who sometimes forget the great economic importance of fish (and particularly of certain fish as articles of food) and its consequences. The articles on *θύννος*, *πηλαμύς*, *πορφύρα*, will serve as instances.

As in the *Glossary of Birds*, the first and chief difficulty is that of identifying the species passing under each name. It is not only that the information is often too slight, but there was anciently in existence no scientific system of nomenclature, and not only may the same name be applied to two or more species (often very different), but different names were freely used of the same fish (and especially of its several

stages of development or different sizes), and there are only too many names for Grey Mullet, for the Wrasses, for Dogfish, Sharks, Shads, Sea Breams, and the crowds of little fish which commentators commonly (and often erroneously) call 'Anchovies'. Now and then Sir D'Arcy corrects the identifications or information contained in the late Professor A. W. Mair's very valuable edition and translation of Oppian (e.g. s.v. *ἐξώκοιτος*, *ἱππος*, *κίρρις*) or in W. Radcliffe's delightful and breezy treatise on *Fishing from the Earliest Times*. He threads his way skilfully through the mazes of synonymy, not infrequently calling to his aid Egyptian and Coptic, as well as modern European, names, though his suggestions as regards derivations and other etymological connexions are not all equally convincing. (Is Mitylene really Musselburgh?) Under each name, as far as the available material permits, there are accounts (with full quotations or references) of methods of capture and of cooking, and of the uses made in medicine or magic of the fish. He who will may find in this volume specifics for ear-ache, toothache, disorders of the spleen, leprosy, superfluous hair, sciatica, the bites of mad dogs and snakes, ulcers, warts, nausea, and many other maladies. (It is interesting to note that Galen tried some of these and found them failures.)

The Glossary is a treasury of folk-lore and of strange stories about fish. We read of the *βοῦς* which settles down over a diver and prevents his return to the surface; of the many (and hard-hearted) wives of the *κόσσυφος*, who watch its capture; of the sensitiveness of the *γλανίς* to thunder and the liability of

the *φαγρός* to colds in the head; of the good fortune of the man who finds the King of the Whelks. There are fishes which have a voice, fishes which are especially attracted by music, and crabs (*πάγουρος*) which are piped into captivity. The stories of riders on dolphins' backs are collected, and there are pleasant illustrations of the affection which the Greeks felt for this animal.

There are many excellent wood-cuts, and it is a pity that (for reasons explained in the Preface) there are not more; two or three of those given by Radcliffe can ill be spared. Here are a few notes made in passing. '*Ημερόκοιτος*' is hardly a 'by-word' for a thief (it is only used of a thief once—in Hesiod, *Op.* 605), and it is hardly proved that this and *φερέοικος* are devices for the avoidance of 'taboo' words for thieves or snails—to neither of which any taboo seems to have attached, and there are perhaps sufficient reasons for calling a modern Greek horse *τὸ ἄλογον* without invoking a taboo. It is a pity that there is no reference (under *θύννος*) to the most famous reference to the Tunny in Greek literature, Aesch. *Pers.* 424 ff. *τοὶ δ' ὥστε θύννους ἢ τιν' ἰχθύων βόλον | ἀγαῖσι κωπῶν θραύμασιν τ' ἐρείπιων | ἔπαιον, ἐρράχιζον*. The use of *κάραβος* in Comedy as a nick-name (for Kallimedon) might have been mentioned. On p. 217 *purpureum* should be *purpuream*. But these are trifles. It is not often that a glossary appears in which so many articles can be read for pleasure as well as for information; but this is one, and its author deserves both our admiration and our gratitude.

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### GREECE AND EUROPE

Bruno SNELL: *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*.

Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen. Pp. 264. Hamburg: Claassen und Goverts, 1946. Cloth and boards.

MOST of these studies have already appeared as separate articles in various journals. The book is held together by the predominantly linguistic interests

of the author rather than by its nominal subject. But it is apparently meant as a semi-popular work; the numerous Greek words are invariably translated, and sometimes transliterated also; references to the Greek texts are frequently omitted, and there are plenty of German translations of some length, particularly in the chapter on the early lyric. As it



deals summarily with a multitude of topics it necessarily contains a good deal of elementary information, not all of it beyond question, e.g. on the chorus of tragedy (that its members were originally dressed as animals). Some careless generalizations have been taken at second-hand, e.g. that Plato banished poetry from his ideal State. Here the influence of Wilamowitz is sometimes too apparent; a particularly foolish dogma of his (that natural science cannot coexist with a belief in the creation of the world) is cited with approval on p. 44.

Snell's account of the pre-Socratic poets and thinkers is an excellent philological gloss on Plato's remark (which he does not cite) that all earlier speculators about nature had failed to distinguish adequately the soul from the body. He has interesting remarks on the Homeric words for 'body', 'soul', and the cognitive processes. He treats the Homeric family of Olympian gods very seriously as representing an early step towards the rational view of nature. The heroes regard the gods with wonder, never (he thinks) with fear, and continue to act naturally in spite of preternatural interference. Snell deduces that for Homer, man, the world, and the gods are interwoven in a rational system. This belief in the rationality of nature was the Greek and later the European view, and hence it is, according to Snell, that the gods survived in art and poetry long after they had been 'killed' by philosophy. Snell's account of the matter is not so fanciful as perhaps it sounds. But it unduly ignores the discrepancies between the Homeric hierarchy of gods and the known cults of historic Greece, and also the difficulty (recognized in various ways by the Greek thinkers themselves) of saying, without reservation and interpretation, that the Homeric gods 'belong to the natural order'.

Snell regards tragedy as a transitional stage between myth and philosophy, since here the gods begin to yield place to universal concepts such as justice. In a chapter on Aristophanes' aesthetics he gives the comic poet credit

for diagnosing the situation correctly; but he is too one-sided to give him the further credit of seeing that the 'naturalistic' philosophers were seeking to replace the old mythology not by pure reason but by a new mythology of their own invention. For Snell the progress was in a single line from concrete and pictorial thinking to the abstract and logical; the transition was assisted by similes, metaphors, and analogies, and also by the nature of the Greek language—the existence of the definite article was a great convenience—which, alone among languages, has not been compelled to import its scientific terminology. At this point there is a short essay on Greek ethics, which, however, does not advance beyond Socrates. Its value lies, as usual, in the treatment of specific words (e.g. the names of the virtues). Linguistic speculations, however, should not be pressed; and Snell perhaps goes too far towards suggesting that the (alleged) absence of a word for the 'will' accounts for the Socratic paradoxes. His speculations on *νομιζέω θεός* with reference to the indictment of Socrates are certainly unwarranted; for *νομιζέω* never meant 'to honour'. Such a meaning is certainly not established by the Xenophontic defence that Socrates in fact honoured the gods by the customary sacrifices. That defence was valid only in the eyes of those who thought Socrates an honest man who would not act in a manner contrary to his beliefs. It had no success with those who suspected him of deliberately concealing his disbelief in the gods of the city. It was of such disbelief, not impious acts or omissions, that Socrates was in fact accused. Snell seems reluctant to admit this fact.

The last two chapters deal with the 'post-philosophic' poetry of Callimachus and with the ideal Arcadia which Virgil, following a hint of Polybius, discovered and bequeathed to later literatures. It will be clear that Snell's analysis of the debt of European thought and art to Greece is not meant to be complete, though on many points he goes into considerable detail. There are few references to Plato or Aristotle; there is

nothing on the growth of the important concept of the natural law, grounded in the very being of man and of the universe, which with the aid of Stoic and Christian thinkers Europe would do well to revive. No doubt it is all to the good that German scholars nowadays

attempt to write books of the more humane variety; but in isolating what is really significant and in combining accuracy with readability, they have still much to learn from French and English scholars.

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### THE AMNESTY OF 403 B.C.

Alfred P. DORJAHN: *Political Forgiveness in Old Athens; The Amnesty of 403 B.C.* (Northwestern University Studies in the Humanities, No. 13.) Pp. 56. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Graduate School, 1946. Cloth, \$1.50.

In a short introduction the author enumerates six examples of amnesty at Athens: the law of Solon in his archonship (here the remark 'also excluded [from the amnesty] were those who went into exile in the time of tyranny' seems to be a mistranslation of the Solonian law in Plutarch, *Solon*, 19), the recall of exiles attributed to Themistocles before the battle of Salamis, the decree of Patrocleides after the battle of Aegospotami, the recall of exiles on the orders of Lysander, the amnesty of 403 B.C., and the proposal of Hypereides after the battle of Chaeronea. No argument is advanced for considering these six cases to be examples of amnesty in the normally accepted sense of the term; in fact it seems proper to draw a distinction between the amnesty of 403 B.C. and the other cases, because in 403 B.C. prosecution was forbidden for all past acts with certain exceptions (*τῶν δὲ παρεληλυθότων μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδένα μνησι-κακεῖν ἐξεῖναι*, *Ath. Pol.* 39. 6)—quite a different matter from giving the franchise to slaves or recalling exiles.

In chapter 1 the date of the amnesty is discussed. The ancient authorities are well set out and the arguments of Grosser and Lübbert are analysed; as these two wrote before the publication of the *Ath. Pol.*, this analysis could well have been omitted. Dorjahn's conclusion is that the amnesty was enacted in 403 B.C. as part of the peace treaty—a conclusion not disputed since the appearance of the *Ath. Pol.*—and that a

reaffirmation of the amnesty took place after the fall of Eleusis in 401 B.C. In the latter point he may well be correct, but some of the arguments he uses are not convincing. 'It may be assumed', he writes on p. 14, 'that all the most ardent supporters of the Thirty had accompanied their leaders to Eleusis immediately after the battle of Mynychia. Consequently they were not participants in the original oaths of amnesty, and hence could claim no protection under them.' It seems reasonable to suppose, therefore, that after the fall of Eleusis . . . a reaffirmation of the amnesty took place.' This is not reconcilable with *Ath. Pol.* 39. 6, where the exception to the amnesty is stated as *πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς τριάκοντα καὶ τοὺς δέκα καὶ τοὺς ἑνδεκα καὶ τοὺς τοῦ Πειραιέως ἄρξαντας, μηδὲ πρὸς τοὺτους ἐὰν διδώσιν εὐθύνas*. Again on p. 23 it is suggested that a reaffirmation of the amnesty accompanied the decision to repay the debt to Sparta *κουρῇ after the fall of Eleusis*. But in *Ath. Pol.* 40. 3 and in Demosthenes *Lept.* 12 this decision is adduced as the first example of *ὁμόνοια*, and in *Ath. Pol.* it comes before the reconciliation with Eleusis. The other chapters deal in a thorough manner with such aspects of the amnesty as institution and ratification, legal scope and implications concerning property, safeguarding by *παραγραφὴ* (Isocrates xviii. 3), and the extent to which it was observed.

In general it is an interesting and thorough study of the amnesty, in which the evidence is well marshalled and the argumentation is clear. Although it may be doubted in some cases whether the argumentation is valid, the effect of the book is to challenge and to evoke interest in problems which con-

cern not only the famous amnesty of the Athenians in 403 B.C. but also its successors down to the amnesty known as the Varkiza Agreement in 1945. It is a worthy number in its series, but the

Northwestern University Press should take note of its Greek accents and spelling (e.g. on p. 6, n. 35).

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### THE ROMAN EPONYMOUS OFFICE

Krister HANELL: *Das altrömische eponyme Amt*. (Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Institutet i Rom, II: 8°.) Pp. 227. Lund: Gleerup, 1946. Paper.

IN this book Mr. Hanell has undertaken a highly original reconstruction of early Roman constitutional history based on a study of the character of the consular *fasti*. These, he argues, take as their starting-point, not the institution of the consulship and the republic, but the year in which the foundation of the Temple of Iuppiter Capitolinus and the simultaneous institution of the practice of naming each year after an eponymous officer together signified the adoption of the pre-Julian cyclical calendar. Just as there were ephors before 753 and archons before 683, so too the Roman office, traditionally the consulate, which became eponymous in 509 (Varro), in fact existed long before then. Prior to 509 the Romans had used a wandering year of ten months. The new calendar and the Capitoline Triad are to be connected with Delphi and Phocis. Beyond Delphi the descent goes back to Babylon; and the idea of an eponymous office links up with the Assyrian *limmu* lists.

The pre-decemviral section of the *fasti* has, however, been reconstructed by the *nobilitas*—especially the *pontifices*—of the fourth and third centuries on the analogy of conditions after 367. Originally there was a single eponymous officer, the *praetor maximus*, who was the senior of three *praetores* (or *tribuni*) who led the three ancestral tribes. This office, as well as the monarchy, continued until 452. The kings were not expelled, but gradually declined into sacral *reges*; when necessary their military functions were transferred to *dictatores*. The period of the *decemviri* marked a major constitutional change. The introduction of hoplite tactics and

mass levies led to the 'Servian' reform and the institution of the centuriate assembly based on wealth, and of the censorship. A new eponymous office was set up at the same time, the consulate (or, as before, tribunate); this was first a dual, but subsequently a multiple, office, but only two members of any annual college were eponymous, though all appear in the *fasti*. The republic properly dates from this time: but the final form of the eponymous office was not achieved until the establishment of the dual consulship in 366, and the passing of the law that one consul might be a plebeian. From 366 can be dated the growth of the *nobilitas*, who shaped the tradition of early Roman history.

It will be apparent that H. does not err on the side of conservatism. His argument is clear and well argued, and he has something valuable to say. But one cannot suppress qualms at an historical method which, after dismissing the virtually unanimous Roman tradition associating the institution of the consulship with the foundation of the republic, then proceeds to attribute weight to odd scraps of information from Zonaras or Festus, the ultimate origin of which can often no longer be determined. Furthermore, the choice of such passages may be arbitrary. For example, H. considers it significant that Gracchanus attributed the institution of the twelve-month year to 'King Tarquinius', which would fit his own view that the pre-Julian calendar dates to 509, and to the still-reigning dynasty of the Tarquins; but why is Gracchanus' view better evidence than that of Licinius Macer, who attributed this calendar to Romulus, or that of Valerius Antias who attributed it to Numa?—a question which does not involve accepting the historicity of either

Romulus or Numa. And even Gracchanus believed that intercalation was introduced by Servius Tullius. The question is complicated; but one may enter a *caveat* against the view that an agricultural people like the Romans, whose very festivals were based on seasonal activities, attempted to work a calendar without a solar basis as late as 509. Nor am I persuaded by H.'s attempt to resuscitate the legend of the wandering ten-month year. In any case, the thesis which brings the Greek (and Roman) calendar from Babylonia about 600, though it has the powerful support of Nilsson and Bickerman, is by no means proved; see, e.g., G. Thomson, *J.H.S.* lxiii, 1943, 52-65, who has collected evidence favouring a tradition going back through Mycenae to Crete.

Still more damaging to H.'s thesis is his failure to show any connexion between his *praetores maximi* and the Temple of Iuppiter Capitolinus. But if it was decided to institute a new cult and temple and to connect these with a new eponymous series for calendar purposes, the obvious step would surely have been to set up an annual priesthood, and to make its holder eponymous like the priest of Athena Lindia at Lindos. Athens and Sparta give no help here, for neither dedicated a State temple in the year it began its eponymous list.

Other doubts also spring up. In what sense was the settlement of 367/6 a compromise giving the *plebs* definite gains (p. 208), if in fact it merely limited the consulate-tribunate to two colleagues per year? The office was already open to plebeians in its multiple days, and after 366 it was still not compulsory for one

consul to be a plebeian. The view that the institution of the *comitia centuriata* dates to the time of the decemvirate comes up against several difficulties if Last is right (*J.R.S.* xxxv, 1945, 44-5) in his thesis that this body began as a military assembly which later acquired judicial powers; for Cicero, *de leg.* iii. 44, refers to a law of the *XII tabulae* which forbade cases involving a citizen's *caput* to be heard except *maximo comitiatu* (cf. Cic. *de rep.* ii. 61: *comitiis centuriatis*)—which would put the purely military stage in the development of the centuriate assembly well before 450.

Finally H.'s theory collapses at the very centre—in his interpretation of the *fasti*. It is essential to his thesis that these are not a list of the chief magistrates of the republic, but simply of the officials who gave their name to the year. Yet he is obliged to admit (p. 203) that from 449 onwards the *eponymi*, as mentioned in authentic records, are only two in number, whereas the *fasti* record the total number of consuls (or tribunes) elected each year. 'Die Eponymenliste wird damit in einen Beamtenkatalog verwandelt (p. 200).' Thus from 449 onwards the *fasti* are a *Beamtenkatalog* of the chief magistrates of the Republic. Roman tradition said the same. But it said it for 509 as well as for 449. Perhaps after all it was right.

This is an ingenious book and a readable one. It says much that is useful, and occasionally a little that is plausible. But in general it exemplifies the perils of hyper-criticism, and is unlikely either to seduce the orthodox or to convert the sceptics.

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#### AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS

E. A. THOMPSON: *The Historical Work of Ammianus Marcellinus*. Pp. xii + 145. Cambridge: University Press, 1947. Cloth, 10s. 6d. net.

THE main obstacle to the fame of Ammianus Marcellinus has been the fact that he lived in the wrong period, far removed from the set periods of our

University courses and frequented only by a handful of modern students. J. W. Mackail, some years ago, rediscovered Ammianus for himself and passed on his discovery to others; that has done something towards giving our author the place in esteem that he deserves. But there is still room for a study, like



this of Mr. Thompson's, that summarizes the main facts and illuminates the main points of controversy.

Chapter I (Biography) acquaints us with the story of Ammianus' life and makes us realize how far it goes to explain the exact kind of history that he produced. Born at Antioch, but, later, an adopted citizen of Rome, a local senator by birth but a soldier by training and service, he combined in himself qualities that were likely to give rise to unusual achievement when fused into one by the passion to write a work of literature. One would like to know how that passion was acquired; for history as Ammianus writes it is not a common accomplishment of soldiers.

Chapter II (Sources), after some close discussion of details, reaches the very satisfying conclusion that Ammianus really deserves the full credit for his work, that he is much more than the mere transmitter of one or two lost histories. Mr. Thompson's methods seem sound and his touch sure. He brings into 'Quellenkunde' a refreshing common sense. We must not substitute for the prima-facie hypothesis other hypotheses that are in no single case proved and that are in no sense inevitable. Study of sources must begin, no doubt, with curious questioning and searching, but it must end with severe criticism, which will often leave very few of the new guesses standing.

Chapter III (Ursicinus) introduces us to a military commander of note, one of Ammianus' own heroes. In view of the great part played by *virī militares* in the life of the Empire of the third and fourth centuries it is interesting and valuable to make the close acquaintance of one. Perhaps we find it hard to share fully in Ammianus' admiration; but that is only to be expected—it was no doubt the immediate touch of the personality of Ursicinus that was impressive.

Chapter IV (Gallus) compels us to reconsider the case of the unfortunate Caesar, who, in modern histories, seems to be condemned out of hand. From this careful consideration of the evidence and judgements of Ammianus, it can be

seen that Gallus was unlucky rather than unworthy, and that he had some positive good qualities which are not usually credited to him. The years of his Caesarship may have not been merely an unhappy interlude. If the *Historia Augusta* is rightly to be dated somewhere near the age of Julian, is there not a strong probability that the glorification in it of the name of Constantius is directed towards Constantius II Augustus and Constantius Caesar?

Chapter V (Julianus) introduces us to a more famous name. It is most interesting to learn from Mr. Thompson's careful quotations that the vast admiration felt by Ammianus for Julian was mixed with blame. One realizes once again the strange blends in Julian, Greek culture and philosophy, obstinate paganism, personal idiosyncrasy, which partly explain why he was the 'Apostate' in vain. He cannot have been much to the taste of many defenders of paganism—including the conservative aristocrats of Rome.

Chapter VI attempts to probe the mystery that surrounds the death of the elder Theodosius. The conclusions reached by Mr. Thompson all seem to be fully justified—that Theodosius was not completely above reproach, that his enemy, Maximinus, was not the utter scoundrel that he has been represented to be, that Ammianus could not discuss the matter freely out of fear of the reigning Emperor, the younger Theodosius. None but the boldest—and most rash—could risk the anger of the master of the legions. But is it not worth while considering whether the apprehensions that certainly haunted Ammianus may have concerned the Emperor's confidants rather than the Emperor himself? Their enmity might be even more easily provoked than the Emperor's by incautious discussion of past scandals, and it may have been just as dangerous.

Chapter VII (The Composition of the Last Six Books) is largely concerned with the same theme—the caution observed by Ammianus in discussing certain matters, particularly of religion. The last six books are, in any case, an

addition to the original scheme and show some special points of treatment.

Chapter VIII sums up on 'Ammianus as an Historian' and concludes that he is entitled to a very high rank, for his vigour and power of realizing action, for his keenness in research and his love of truth, for his moral worth, and for an insight manifested at least in flashes. Mr. Thompson's readers are likely to accept his verdict without serious question.

The fourth century of Rome is a sad age to read about: it must have been a terrible age to live in. But tragedy and strain should not condemn an age to oblivion. There may be deep human interest hidden in it, serious historical lessons to be learned from it. As one reads the story of the times of Valentinian I and Theodosius I, one becomes conscious of factors not altogether unfamiliar at much later dates—the overmastering greed and ambition of wealthy Roman nobles, the despair of the impoverished provincials. The fact that

the depressed classes could be so far reduced by spoliation and destructive taxation as actually to make common cause with the barbarian invaders has surely a very serious lesson for to-day.

The present reviewer may perhaps be forgiven if he directs Mr. Thompson's attention to a non-literary source—the imperial coins of the period. They are not eloquent in the same degree as the coins of the Early Empire, but they have still much to say to the student who will observe them closely and interrogate them correctly. The closer study of these coins, as it has been conducted in recent years by Mr. J. W. E. Pearce in a series of articles, can contribute seriously to the solution of some difficult historical problems. It would be surprising if the coins do not add something to our knowledge of Ammianus. Mr. Thompson gives every promise of being the right man to draw information from any source, however new.

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#### FROM CONSTANTINE TO THEODOSIUS THE GREAT

André PIGANIOU: *L'Empire chrétien*, 325-395. (Histoire Générale fondée par Gustave Glotz: Histoire Romaine, Tome 4, Deuxième Partie.) Pp. xvi+446. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947. Paper, 350 fr.

THIS book gives us the facts of the history of the Roman Empire from the Council of Nicaea to the death of Theodosius the Great. The scheme of M. PiganioU's work can be briefly defined: it opens with a section on the sources and bibliography; the first part deals with 'Les Personnages et les Événements'; the second part describes 'Les Institutions et la Vie sociale'—la production et la circulation: l'empereur et la bureaucratie; la réquisition des hommes et des biens: la hiérarchie sociale: l'église (including monasticism and the expansion of Christianity): la vie intellectuelle: l'évolution de la morale et du droit. This part is followed by a 'Conclusion' in which the causes of the ruin of the Roman Empire are discussed.

This is a useful book. M. PiganioU, as he proved in his *History of Rome* (1939), has admirably mastered the modern literature, and, writing in France, he has been able to make use of work published on the Continent during the war which is still inaccessible in this country. The second part of the book, in particular, provides the student with a summary which he could not so conveniently obtain elsewhere. Thus, for example, the section on the Emperor is a good short statement which takes account of the studies of Alföldi, Treitinger, Grabar, and Ensslin. Yet it must be confessed that to the present reviewer the book is a disappointment, for M. PiganioU has missed an opportunity. The fourth century of our era produced a surprising number of outstanding personalities, alike in East and West, in Church and State: Antony, Basil, Chrysostom, Ambrose; Julian and Theodosius the Great. And here we have sources which render the writing of history possible; the contrast pre-

sented by the fifth century is striking—the fragments of Olympiodorus and Priscus leave us with gaps which can be filled only with dubious conjecture. In this book these fourth-century figures do not come to life: it may be doubted whether an interest in the period will be awakened if such an interest has not already taken possession of the reader. And that is the more to be regretted since M. Piganiol can write with vigour and is not subject to the inhibitions of the hagiographers. He warns the reader that he must use all the apologies of Athanasius with the greatest circumspection, and of the saint his judgement is that 'il n'hésitait pas à déchaîner contre ses ennemis des pogromes meurtriers... partout, sur son passage, il fera surgir la haine et la guerre'. M. Piganiol is so much concerned with the facts that he does not allow himself space for living character sketches.

The treatment of Constantine the Great may serve as an illustration. On the Emperor's religious policy M. Piganiol writes: 'Son désir personnel semble avoir été de substituer aux pratiques grossières du paganisme, qu'il a condamnées à plusieurs reprises, une religion philosophique, où païens éclairés et chrétiens pourraient communier, puis-que'elle serait la vérité' (*Histoire de Rome*, p. 467), and in this book he states that Constantine thought to have discovered in Christianity the highest expression of the cult of the Great God of Plato (p. 72). Can M. Piganiol have really studied the Constantinian documents? These are the primary sources and, if they are to be regarded as genuine, it is on these primary sources that any reconstruction of the Emperor's belief must be based. Constantine, it may be suggested, did at least regard himself as a Christian—not as the exponent of a philosophic religion which should embrace both pagans and Christians. One would like to know precisely on what source such an interpretation is founded. In this book M. Piganiol's summary of the reign is very remarkable: 'si on le juge', he writes, 'du point de vue de Rome son compte est lourd. Il a renforcé sur les grands

domaines l'institution naissante du servage. Il a brûlé les livres des philosophes. Il a appelé des généraux germanaux aux plus grands honneurs de l'État... Il reste qu'il a trahi Rome.'—And Constantine the ever-victorious general, Constantine the founder of Constantinople, Constantine 'creator and first representative of a universal Christian conception of Empire' (Count Stauffenberg), what of him? Is it merely the prejudice of a student of East Roman history which forces one to protest against such a judgement? 'Un pauvre homme qui tâtonnait' (Piganiol, *L'empereur Constantin*, Paris, 1932, p. 226)—is this really the final word on the first Christian Emperor?

There are other questions which a reader might desire to put to M. Piganiol; for instance, is the rise of monasticism adequately explained on economic grounds, accounted for by 'causes sociales plutôt que religieuses'? 'Il s'agit', we read, 'd'une protestation des individus écrasés par des institutions inhumaines. Ceux qui prennent les déserts sont des réfractaires sociaux' (p. 376). Doubtless there is some truth in this explanation, but how much is omitted! What of St. Antony, the first monk, who—surely in error—is here called 'cet analphabète copte'? East Roman asceticism is a very complex movement.

M. Piganiol follows Dessau and Alföldi in dating the *Historia Augusta* to the reign of Theodosius the Great, but he adds: 'je persiste à penser que Mommsen avait raison d'y reconnaître des éléments du début du IV<sup>e</sup> siècle, remaniés par les derniers éditeurs' (p. 386). It would be of no little interest to know where precisely M. Piganiol discovers these 'elements'.

But it is probable that readers will find the 'Conclusion' of special interest (pp. 411–22). In discussing the causes of the ruin of the Empire which have been suggested by modern scholarship M. Piganiol pays a generous tribute to the men who in the fourth century sought to restore society and the Roman State. He rejects Seeck's theory of the extermination of the Best: the fourth century

produced 'de très beaux types humains'—in this respect the Age of the Antonines could not rival it (pp. 412–13). The fall of the Empire is not due to the privation of liberty through the growth of bureaucracy: liberty had been dead for centuries; now all the peoples of the Roman world were equal, and 'la renaissance et la multiplication des diètes locales leur permettent d'exprimer leurs vœux'. It is not Christianity which was responsible: Christianity 'était capable au contraire, s'il en avait eu le temps, de renforcer son [i.e. of the Empire] unité morale.' It is not true that intellectual life was 'en régression': the *codex* taking the place of the *volumen* becomes a wonderful instrument of cul-

ture: a new art and a new architecture make their appearance—a new conception of truth and beauty; a new conception, too, of collective work inspired by an ideal of social service. Rome was rising from the ruin of the third century and passing through an internal transformation. And all this effort was rendered vain by the unceasing attacks of Germans who 'aux frontières de l'empire avaient réussi à vivre pendant des siècles sans se civiliser'. In fact 'La civilisation romaine n'est pas morte de sa belle mort. Elle a été assassinée.' It is with this challenge to the Germans that M. Piganiol closes his book.

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#### CICERONIANISM

Walter RÜEGG: *Cicero und der Humanismus*; Formale Untersuchungen über Petrarca und Erasmus. Pp. xxxi + 139. Zürich: Rhein-Verlag, 1946. Paper, 10 Sw. fr.

Harold S. WILSON and Clarence A. FORBES: Gabriel Harvey's *Ciceronianus*. (University of Nebraska Studies in the Humanities, No. 4.) Pp. vii + 137. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1945. Paper.

It is perhaps not without historical and social significance that recent years have shown a revival of keen interest in the nature and meaning of the transition from the Middle Ages to the modern world. Rüegg, in fact, in his long introduction frankly declares that this piece of research originated in a problem of the cultural history of modern Germany, viz. the background and consequences of Mommsen's misguided criticism of Cicero, with the closely related question of the defectiveness of the 'Neuhumanismus' of Winckelmann. He makes plain at once his view that educational doctrines which are the slaves of absolute, objective standards or which assume man to be at the mercy of world forces and to be only a link in a chain of mechanical causality carry in them germs of possible or actual catastrophe.

He therefore sets out to examine in

Petrarch and Erasmus the character and quality of humanism based on an attitude towards Cicero. He discusses briefly the term 'Humanismus' (coined by Niethammer in 1808) and sharply distinguishes between its real meaning for Petrarch and the classicism which consists in a purely literal, phraseological, and factual imitation of one or more ancient authors, and which, therefore, is little more than a modified scholastic process. For Petrarch it is not so much the object or personality imitated which matters most, but rather a particular form of subjective relation. Rüegg makes 'form' the keyword, and the basic idea of Petrarch's humanism appears to be a 'subjektiv-oratorisches Formerlebnis'. Cicero provides the formal model for the realization of an ideal human relationship that is grounded in speech. The result of following the model will be to give the fullest expression to our personality, and, for this point of view, 'le style est l'homme' in the most real sense. It is not surprising that we find this principle most clearly operating in Petrarch's letters. Rüegg is guilty of a little exaggeration in pressing home his belief, but what he has said is well said and is a sound reply to some of the charges that have occasionally been directed against Petrarch's humanism.



In the case of Erasmus, it would obviously be impossible to think of Cicero as being a supremely dominating example, and Rüegg has confined his inquiry to justifiably narrow limits, deliberately excluding any detailed assessment of the influence of Horace, Seneca, and Lucian. But he is able to demonstrate fairly convincingly that the spirit of Erasmus' humanism is of the same kind as Petrarch's in essence. It is a Christian humanism that he defends against scholastics, religious reformers, and the 'Ciceroniani'. It involved no dogmatic revolution; as Petrarch had said, 'non Ciceronianus certe nec Platonius, sed Christianus sum'. It is a 'formale Revolution'—not a mere literary cult, but something pursued no less systematically and related more nearly than classicism could ever be to the deeper needs of human personality. Rüegg has done a very useful service to his day in presenting this study, which, for all that it may have in it scarcely anything new, gives matter for careful thought.

Gabriel Harvey, the learned friend of Spenser, patronized by Lord Burghley and the Earl of Leicester, and known for his controversy with Nashe, was Praelector of Rhetoric at Cambridge from April 1574 to late in 1576. His *Ciceronianus* oration, delivered in May 1576 and published in 1577, has not been republished in its complete form since the original issue. The text of the present edition is based on a copy in the Huntington Library, with some minor changes of punctuation, which might profitably have been made to conform still more to ordinary modern practice. The speech goes some way towards disproving the accusation of pedantry which, with inadequate justification, is made against Harvey. It is designed formally to inaugurate a course of lectures dealing with the analysis of rhetorical models, and, apart from its intrinsic interest, is of some value for the student of Elizabethan educational and rhetorical theory. He brings himself face to face with the problem, which for long had vexed men of learning, as to the nature of the best latinity and the

ways of achieving it, and shows how he himself is a brand saved from the burning. Admitting the rhetorical principle of *imitatio*, he like most others recognized Cicero as the supreme stylist and once had been a devotee of the Italianate Ciceronianism with its crude and extravagant preoccupation with word and phrase copying; at that time he had considered himself to be *perfectus putusque Ciceronianus* and had reviled with violence the views and manner of Erasmus and his followers. But later, through reading the *Ciceronianus* of Ioannes Sambucus, he had come to find the *Ciceronianus* of Ramus, which converted him to the richer and truer Ciceronianism and through which he became now 'perfectissimus putissimusque Ciceronianus . . . qualem Ludouicus fortasse Ciceronianissimum nominaret'. He now knew that the sound teacher 'nec solum τὸν λόγον respiciat sed multo magis ipsam . . . σύνεσιν atque γνώσιν'. This salutary doctrine, accepted as it was by Erasmus, Ramus, Sturm, Smith, and Cheke, became Harvey's gospel and led him to a severe depreciation of Ascham's *Scholemaster*. The modern reader will find the oration, for all its ingenuity and technical virtuosity, lacking in real originality of invention and spoiled by the excessive use of *amplificatio*, e.g. in the praise of Cicero (pp. 46 ff.) and of Ramus (pp. 72 ff.), but, on the whole, it is a fair sample of Renaissance latinity.

The Introduction and notes by Mr. Wilson are sensible, useful, and adequate, his biographical discussions being neatly handled and his exegetical comments being suitably brief. In the text *clarrissimae* (p. 86) and *lautitio* (p. 100) look like misprints. The translation, which is the work of Mr. Forbes, is mostly satisfactory. Though it is a thankless and precarious task to undertake an English rendering of this type of oration, he has succeeded fairly well. But he invites criticism by omissions of words, e.g. *magis* (p. 55), *etiamnum* (p. 57), *meorum* (p. 69), *tam iucundum* and *ornatum* (p. 73), *videri* (p. 83), and whole phrases, e.g. *eodem . . . puncto* (p. 73), *ad . . . aggregavi* and *et . . . Memoriam*

(p. 77), *discite . . . amplexari* (p. 83); and by some doubtful renderings, e.g. *liquidus* ('smooth', though there is no reason to avoid 'clear', p. 57) and *de meliøre nota* ('better-known', but 'of better quality' is more likely, p. 95);

and by occasional infelicities, e.g. the use of the colloquialisms 'speechify' and 'splendiferous' (p. 87).

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## SHORT REVIEWS

Hans HERTER: *Platons Akademie*. Pp. 40. Bonn: Scheur, 1946. Paper.

THIS is a compressed but very readable account of what is known, or can be reasonably inferred, about the founding of the Academy and the studies pursued there. The author is well posted in recent Platonic research, and the references in his notes to modern books and articles constitute not the least valuable part of his work. Acquaintance with Professor Cherniss's recent *Riddle of the Early Academy*, which was probably not available to him, might have modified his account of the Idea-Number theory: is it true that the Ideas were 'actually represented as geometrical figures'? Some readers may think that the extent to which the natural sciences were studied in the Academy during Plato's lifetime is a trifle overestimated. Incidentally it is pleasant to be reminded that Plato, being no *ἡμερόκοιτος*, invented an alarm-clock, and was the 'father of the Kneipcomment'.

R. HACKFORTH.

Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge.

Robert Pierce CASEY: *The De Incarnatione of Athanasius*. Part 2: The Short Recension. (Studies and Documents, XIV. 2.) Pp. lii+86. London: Christophers, 1946. Paper, 15s. net.

THE existence of the short recension of the *de Incarnatione* has been known for more than twenty years. This study of it, together with the companion work on the long recension by G. J. Ryan, will do much towards the formation of a sound text of the *de Incarnatione*. In Part I Ryan gives a composite collation of the manuscripts of the long recension—his list contains twenty-five—and discusses their relations. In the present work R. P. Casey describes the authorities for the short recension—three manuscripts, the Syriac version, and some patristic quotations—and gives collations of the Dochiarian MS. 78 (d) and of the relevant parts of the Laurentian Catena and the Catena in Vat. gr. 1431. He also provides a page-for-page and line-for-line reprint of Robertson's edition of the text, which is used as the basis for all the collations in both parts.

The conclusions reached by Casey are that the short recension is a literary revision of the long, made in the fourth century, perhaps by Athanasius himself or one of his immediate circle. In some cases it preserves the true reading where all the long recension manuscripts are in error. Where the long recension manuscripts differ among themselves the original reading is that supported by the

true text of the short recension. No wrong reading of the long recension is ever supported by the true text of the short. The General Editors do not accept all of these conclusions. In particular they hold that if both recensions are by Athanasius, the short must have been the earlier; but the possibility is not excluded that the short is the work of an Apollinarian contemporary of Athanasius. Be that as it may, the evidence here collected and set in order and the illuminating discussion of it will be indispensable to all future students of the *de Incarnatione*.

One point of detail: the reading *πληρωθῆ* (*de Inc.* xvi. 2, codd. CDd) is not a 'singular reading of Cod. 17 of Eph. iii. 19' (p. xix). It is the reading of B, 33 (formerly 17), and 462. And two misprints: p. xxxi, l. 5 from foot, read *λόγος*; pp. xlv-l headings, read DOCHIARIOU.

T. W. MANSON.

University of Manchester.

Martin VAN DEN BRUWAENE: *Études sur Cicéron*. Pp. III. Brussels: L'Édition Universelle, 1946. Paper.

THIS is a collection of four short lectures, entitled 'La dot de Terentia', 'Les édits et le bon droit dans la pratique de Cicéron', 'La notion du prince chez Cicéron', and 'Démosthène et Cicéron'.

In the first, after discussing Terentia's independence in financial matters and the circumstances leading up to her divorce, the author points out that Cicero's allusions (in his letters) to the return of her dowry (and likewise the dowries of Publilia and Tullia) seem to imply, not a legal, but only a moral, obligation on the husband to return the dowry of a divorced wife; from this evidence alone he proceeds to suggest some not very clear but quite unwarranted conclusions about the *actio rei uxoriae* in Cicero's day. In the second the author recounts how Verres, in his praetorian edict, altered the existing law (*Verr.* II. i. 104 ff., 115 ff.), and explains the grounds on which Cicero objected to this procedure; he then discusses and defends Cicero's conduct when, in dealing with the Scaptius affair, he found his own edict in conflict with a *senatus consultum*. In the third, the author deals with the controversial theme of the *princeps civitatis* in Cicero's *De Republica*; he follows Meyer (*Caesars Monarchie*, 177 ff.) without even noticing any of the objections which have been made to Meyer's theories. In the fourth he draws some very superficial comparisons between Demosthenes and Cicero; this superficiality becomes ridiculous

when he proceeds to count the syllables in the first six lines of their *First Philippics*, and to 'prove', by dint of some manipulation, that the groups of syllables are arranged 'sur le même schéma' in both.

All four lectures reveal serious defects of scholarship: misinterpretations of Latin are frequent, and misleading statements or mistakes (in references and other details) occur on almost every page.

W. S. WATT.

Balliol College, Oxford.

Quintus Curtius. With an English translation by John C. ROLFE. 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library.) Pp. xxxv + 429; v + 629. London: Heinemann, 1946. Cloth, 10s. net each.

DR. J. C. ROLFE, Professor of Latin in the University of Pennsylvania, who had already provided Sallust, Nepos, Suetonius, Gellius, and Ammianus for the Loeb series, had finished his work on Curtius when he died in 1943. In his introduction he assigns Curtius to the reign of Claudius rather than to that of Vespasian (though he rightly attaches no weight to the alleged play on words in x. 9. 4) and inclines to identify him with the rhetor mentioned by Suetonius. The text follows Hedicke's edition of 1908, and the editor has made few changes except in matters of punctuation, but the general editors of the series, in revising his work, have admitted some conjectures of their own. Of these Warming-ton's xx for xc at iv. 3. 11 seems necessary; at iii. 11. 15 Post's *obdita genus tenus* for *ob id genus* presents a dubious use of *tenus* with a singular genitive, which, if one found it in the manuscripts, one would be tempted to emend (as it has been emended in Livy xl. 40. 8) to *genibus tenus*; his *multo* at the same place would be ingenious if there were reason to be dissatisfied with *inulti*. In the translation there are some strange mistakes, and, what is perhaps even more regrettable, the English often does much less than justice to Curtius' easy and pleasant style. Such things as 'began to warn their countrymen that a king whom Syria, whom Phoenicia, had received they also should suffer to enter their city', or 'whithersoever Darius should have been able to flee, he could follow' (to take two specimens at random) are in the tradition of the worst kind of 'crib'. In this respect the version compares none too favourably with that which Peter Pratt, 'of the East India House', published over a century ago; as for accuracy, it is disquieting to observe that the amateur was right at most of the places where the professional goes astray.

C. J. FORDYCE.

University of Glasgow.

Erik WISTRAND: *Nach innen oder nach aussen?* Zum geographischen Sprachgebrauch der Römer. (Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift, lii. 1.) Pp. 55. Göteborg: Wettergren & Kerber, 1946. Paper, Kr. 2.50.

PUTTING our mind's eye on the shore, we think of the sea as outside the land and of the high seas as far out; in the first part of this excellent study Dr. Wistrand shows that the Romans, looking from

somewhere between shore and horizon, could, and often did, think of the land as outside the sea and of deep waters as far in, and that the sea could be regarded as an *orbis*, corresponding to the *orbis terrarum*, with its own centre and circumference. A ship, or a swimmer, is said *evehit, expont, eici, exire in terram*, waves *efferti, emitti, effundi, foras evolvi*; a bay can be regarded as an outlet rather than as an inlet; a landing-place (Stat. S. ii. 2. 13) *exit in terras*. Correspondingly we have *fretum inire, aquas ingredi, pontum irrumpere*, and the like; Seneca (*Dial.* i. 1. 4) has *undas introrsus agi* of the ebb-tide, and when Pliny (*N.H.* iv. 104) says that Mictis a *Brilannia introrsum sex dierum navigatione abest* he means that it is six days farther out to sea. A river can be said either *effluere* or *influerre in mare*: both in Pliny and in Avienus the *in*-compounds are the commoner. The heavens can be looked at in a similar way: they too can be an *orbis*. Sky, like sea, has its (*interior*) *sinus* or *recessus*; *medius aer* corresponds to *medium mare*. In conclusion he adduces some related idioms, that by which Tacitus describes the eastern tribes of Germany not only as *ulteriores* but also as *interiores*, and the use of *orbis* by which a part of the world is regarded as constituting an *orbis* by itself; he has also useful notes on the geographical uses of *imus* and *adversus*. In three appendixes he discusses (1) *litus* meaning 'landing-place' and 'foreshore' (its juristic sense) and the use of *litus* for *aquae litorales*, by which he justifies *litus summovere* in Hor. *Od.* ii. 18. 21 and *e litore* in Luc. viii. 560; (2) a difficult passage of Pliny, *N.H.* ii. 164 (of which all the translations which have been offered make nonsense), where he takes *a primis aquis*, 'where the water begins', as explaining *extremum mare*; (3) *illo litore* and *alio orbe* in Luc. v. 617-20.

Dr. Wistrand's analysis of these idioms throws new light on a number of texts, and his sensitiveness to language, his common sense, and his orderly handling of his material make this study a model of its kind.

C. J. FORDYCE.

University of Glasgow.

Constantine E. PERIPHANAKIS: *La Théorie grecque du droit et le classicisme actuel*. Pp. 218. Athens: privately printed, 1946. Paper.

THIS is a careful summary of the classical conceptions of law and justice, expressed by Greek writers from Homer onwards, and by Roman writers influenced by them, followed by a detailed comparison with the principles of modern jurisprudence, from the Revival of Learning to the Charter of the United Nations and the most recent writings, especially of French and Greek jurists. All the principal texts are quoted in the original and in translation, and there are copious references to the literature. The book was first published in modern Greek in 1939 and reprinted in 1942, but has been thoroughly revised, with some striking allusions to recent fascist and totalitarian writings.

The influence of Greek moral and political thinking on modern writers has been profound. Much

of it has been direct and verbal; but what is more impressive is the correspondence of method and outlook among thinkers who were at least trying to be independent and to start from first principles, such as the anthropological sociologists and the economists. Especially interesting is the discussion of freedom, where the Christian view of the importance of the individual personality intervenes to modify the demands made by the ancient State on the lives and conduct of its members, demands comparable to those of Mussolini or Hitler; and also to widen the range of persons with personal liberty within the State, by the principle of the Equality of Man. It is useful, too, to have in full the evidence for Greek belief in progress and development from Xenophanes onwards, and in the influence of geographical and economical factors on it.

Oxford.

J. L. MYRES.

Cornelia Steketee HULST: *Perseus and the Gorgon*. Pp. xvii+222; frontispiece, 83 ill. in text. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1946. Cloth, \$4.50.

PERSEUS, it seems, was a perfectly real person, a vigorous prince contemporary with Thutmose III of Egypt and his ally. Both were the implacable enemies of an Asiatic cult of Mesopotamian connexions, with its trinity of a mother-goddess (the Gorgon), her serpent-consort, and their child, the Sungod. They strove successfully to replace it by the superior 'Aryan' worship (both men were 'Aryans') of a bull-father, a cow-mother, and a daughter, who, whether called Athena or some other name, was Wisdom. The very fine Gorgon found in Corfu in the days when Wilhelm II lived at the Achilleion is from a temple to the Asiatic goddess, dating, not from the archaic period, but from the neighbourhood of 1500 B.C. It had been put up by the Hyksos after their expulsion from Egypt, and Perseus, in pursuance of his general policy, utterly destroyed it, blotted out its very memory, knocked the head off the statue, and carried away a few architectural fragments which afterwards were found at Tiryns and Mycenae. His death-mask is preserved to us in the first shaft-grave at Mycenae.

These interesting facts, and the similar and parallel career of Theseus, who came to an understanding with Minos, Thutmose's governor in Crete, were among the things revealed to the initiate at Eleusis, but the vulgar knew only the common myths. Hence sundry misunderstandings in later times.

Common politeness forbids public contradiction of a venerable lady in the ninth decade of her life. Years have not blunted her enthusiasm for her subject nor the vigour of her imagination, and her book is a handsome one, well printed and with the illustrations excellently reproduced.

H. J. ROSE.

University of St. Andrews.

William G. MOST: *The Syntax of the Vitae Sanctorum Hiberniae*. (Studies in Medieval and Re-

naissance Latin Language and Literature, Vol. XXI.) Pp. xxvi+356. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1946. Paper.

THE texts on which this study is based are those printed in Plummer's *Vitae Sanctorum Hiberniae*; its purpose, in the words of the preface, is 'to investigate the syntax of the *Vitae* . . . systematically and to bring the syntactical phenomena of the *Vitae* into historical relation with the syntax of Classical, Silver, and Late Latin writers. An attempt has also been made to investigate and present the influence of Old Irish syntax on the Latin syntax of the *Vitae*. The term Old Irish is used here in a broad sense, so as to include both Old and Middle Irish.' Other terms also have apparently been used in a broad sense. The systematic investigation consists in arranging the material under the headings which appear in Schmalz-Hofmann; the historical relation is established merely by reference to the writer's chosen lexical and syntactical guides. When these appear to fail, the quest is carried no farther. Thus, at p. 26, for *dissimile* . . . *et*, a moment's search in another dictionary would have provided a batch of examples from Cicero. No search at all should be required to raise the question whether the statement (on this same example) that here 'we have an adjective which in Classical Latin would be used with the dative, but here the dative is replaced by *et*' might not have been more happily expressed. The preface claims that 'the more important monographs dealing with the syntax of Late Latin have been utilized', but there is little evidence that they have been used with profit.

The chapter on the influence of Old Irish syntax is disappointing. One might have expected it to be the most valuable and interesting part of the book, but very few of the suggestions made are plausible; some are absurd. The statement (p. 285) that *oculus* etymologically means 'with him (it)' is strange: it would, I imagine, have surprised Thurneysen (cf. *Handb.*, p. 499). But even if it were true, it could not possibly account for the frequency of expressions with *cum*, 'usually preferred to coordination with *et*', in the *Vitae*.

Problem: whether a man who believes *porcellus* to be an adjective, or his printer, is the more likely to have credited the Latin language with a 'future passive participle'.

I. M. CAMPBELL.

University of Glasgow.

Sister Frances Clare NOCK, S.C.N.: *The Vita Sancti Fructuosi*. Text with a Translation, Introduction, and Commentary. (Studies in Medieval History, New Series, Vol. VII.) Pp. vii+163. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1946. Paper.

Joseph N. GARVIN: *The Vitae Sanctorum Patrum Emeretensium*. Text and Translation, with an Introduction and Commentary. (Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Latin Language and Literature, Vol. XIX.) Pp. vii+567. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1946. Paper.

BOTH these works should be of considerable interest and value to the student of Visigothic Spain. That



they should appear from the same press in the same year is a fitting continuation of a tradition that has linked them from the beginning of their history. They appear together in more than one manuscript, and both were formerly ascribed, on no very sound evidence, to the single authorship of a shadowy and unconvincing figure 'Paul, deacon of Mérida', an ascription which the present editors rightly reject. But both would appear at least to have their origins in Mérida, and a number of linguistic correspondences seem to indicate, if not a common authorship, at any rate close familiarity on the part of the author of one text with the other. Their date is not easily determined, but is most probably to be assigned to the seventh century.

It is a pity that the student of Visigothic Latinity fares rather badly. The texts have no great intrinsic linguistic interest, and the editors, by regularizing the orthography, have carried the matter a stage farther. But in any case Sister

Nock does not undertake to deal with linguistic matters. Most of her Introduction is concerned with the value of her text as an historical source and with the personality and cult of St. Fructuosus. Her Commentary, which is only twenty pages long, hardly mentions questions of language. The *Vitas*, on the other hand, as the form of the title itself might suggest, does interest itself in the language. Here the bulk of the Introduction is given over to an examination of the syntax, made according to the usual plan of this series. The weaknesses of the system are still apparent, and the claim of the preface that the Commentary deals with its material 'something after the manner of Einar Löfstedt' is an expression of intention rather than achievement. *Vehiculum* (p. 37) is not a diminutive; and Caesar's 'more carefully composed *Bellum gallicanum*' (p. 53) is generally known by a more carefully composed title than this.

I. M. CAMPBELL.

University of Glasgow.

## SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS

ARCHIVUM PHILOLOGICUM (Budapest)  
LXIX: MAY, 1946

J. Huszti, *Periods of Roman Literature*: in dividing Roman literature into periods it is not Greek influence which is of primary importance but the development of Roman life as a whole, particularly its political development. S. Szádeczky-Kardoss, *Kritische und exegetische Bemerkungen zu Mimmermos Fr. 2*: takes ἀπὸ ἔπος as the subject of the temporal clause in l. 2; reads ἀπὸ ἡς as against Schneidewin's ἀπὸ ἡς, and defends the resulting hiatus by Theogn. 1066, arguing that Theogn. 1063-6 is an interpolation from Mimn. K. Marót, *Zum römischen Managlauben*: discusses the problem of *imperium*, mainly in criticism of Wagenvoort. S. Borzák, *Vergilianum*: explains *Aen.* iii. 302, 349 f., 497 by reference to Gell. xvi. 13. 9. O. Szemerényi, *Latin sum*: postulates a Latin coinage \**esomi* beside \**esmi*, giving \**esom* and finally *sum*.

LXX: MAY, 1947

S. Borzák, *Die simplicitas und der römische Puritanismus*: *simplicitas* on the one hand is a facet of the ideal old Roman character, exemplified in Cato; on the other, with Petronius and Martial (Petr. 132. 15 *nova simplicitas*) it is a reaction against the strictness and prudery of Roman puritanism. Á. Brusznay, *Moirai, Apollon, Euphorbos*: ll. xix. 416-17 is adduced against Kerényi's view of ll. xvii. 849-50 as evidence for the ancient tradition of a link between Pythagoras and Apollo. S. Szádeczky-Kardoss, *Die Verurteilung des Themistokles*: supports Busolt against Usteri (*Achtung u. Verb. im gr. Recht* 53 ff.) and Lipsius (*Alt. Recht* 379). O. Szemerényi, *Graeca I*: Hom. ἐργηρόφρων, ἐργηρόφρε are explained as *ad hoc* formations, the first modelled on a postulated \**deōphra* from \**dephānu*, the second in-

fluenced by μῆφρα which precedes it in the two places where it occurs (*H* 371 = *Σ* 299). II: *θεῖς*, *ἔς*, *δός*: Schwyzler's explanation is abandoned in favour of Brugmann's view that these are inflexives in origin.

ERANOS

1947, fasc. iii-iv.

A. Tovar, *Über das Keltiberische und die anderen alten Sprachen Spaniens*: summarizes present views: Iberian has African connexions, Celtiberian belongs to the Goidelic group. H. J. Rose, *On an Epic Idiom in Aeschylus*: argues that Aeschylus greatly extends the type μένος 'Ακν-ρόμο, not confining it to proper names, and adding adjectives: he thus explains Agamemnon 104-5, 1227-30, *Supplices* 360, 578, 1034. The idiom becomes less frequent in the later plays. R. Ganszyniec, *ΘΥΡΑΖΕ ΚΑΡΕΕ*: shows that the reading *Kāpes* and an associated explanation of the line *θύραζε Κāpes, οὐκέρ' Ἀνθεστήρια* go back to Didymus, whereas *κῆpes* first appears in Photius, being a scholarly 'emendation', perhaps by someone who knew the *Lemuria*. The line looks as if it came from a play. The ceremonies of the Anthesteria presume that the ghosts do not come indoors; *κῆpes* cannot mean *φυλα*. H. Hagendahl, *Methods of Citation in Post-Classical Latin Prose*: considers the methods of Christian authors in quoting pagan. G. Wiman, *Ad Arnobium*: offers many emendations. E. Gren, *Zu den Legenden von der Gründung Konstantinopels*: the founding of Constantinople was associated with various prophecies about Rome. A. Andrén, *Bemerkungen zu den Bakchiastexten und anderen Papyri der Lunder Papyrusammlung* [Akad. Abhandl. Lund 1946]. A. G. Elg, *De Ov. Fast. 2. 398 interpretando*: supposes aposiopesis and reads *suspīcor*. M. P. Nilsson, *Sophia-Prunikos*: shows that προῖνκος or προῖνεις

means 'bearer', a good epithet for the Gnostic *Sophia*, that carries something from the divine world to the material.

### CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

XLIII. 1: JANUARY, 1948

H. F. North, *The Concept of Sophrosyne in Greek Literary Criticism*: examines the non-moral use of *σωφροσύνη*, its cognates, and its opposites, as applied to style. B. L. Charney, *Textual Notes on Seneca*: defends the manuscript reading at *Ep.* 17. 6 *quanto hoc*, 23. 10 *putat*, 26. 8 *sacra*, 47. 5 (*toro*) unnecessary), 47. 8 *habent*, 59. 15 *illi*, 68. 14 *domuit*, 76. 16 *perfecta*, 78. 8 (*sut*) unnecessary), 78. 3 (*et*) *amici* unnecessary), 78. 17 *exsurgat*, 82. 14 *extrema*, 88. 17 *utique secunda*, 88. 13 *communem*, 89. 15 *inter aestimata*, 89. 20 *arationibus vestris*, 101. 2 *imminebat*, 114. 21 *avertunt*, 119. 10 *circa dicimus*, 123. 4 *tolli*. R. A. Brower, *The*

*Theban Eagle in English Plumage*: illustrates the inadequacy of English translators in reproducing the metaphors and the patterns of Pindar. B. B. Boyer, *Insular Contribution to Medieval Literary Tradition on the Continent* (II): discusses insular manuscripts of Bede. R. S. Brumbaugh, *The Numbers in Plato's Critias*: the numbers in the account of Atlantis are so constructed that each 'reflects some aspect of the rulers' basic and traditional mathematical and philosophic confusion'. R. J. M. Lindsay, *The Chronology of Catullus' Life*: points out difficulties in theories of Rothstein and Maas; poem 101 gives no evidence for a visit to his brother's tomb and so is useless for dating. G. Downey on Procopius, *De Aedif.* i. 4. 3, deletes *καὶ ἐνθα* . . . *παπακλειμένον* as an insertion due to misunderstanding: P. mentions only two churches, SS. Peter and Paul and SS. Sergius and Bacchus. M. P. Cunningham on Seneca, *Ep.* 14. 8, defends *it a quo propior*.

## CORRESPONDENCE

THE EDITOR, *The Classical Review*

Sir,

The splendid, though alas! mutilated, mosaic in the Naples Museum, representing the victory of Alexander over Darius at the Battle of Issus, is, of course, well known; but I am not aware that attention has ever been drawn to the great tree whose gaunt trunk and lifeless boughs form so conspicuous a feature in the left half of the design.

To me, at least, it is tempting to connect this with the following passage from Yule's *Marco Polo* (i. xxii):

At the end of (those) eight days you arrive at a Province which is called Tonocain [E. Kuhistan of Persia]. It . . . contains an immense plain on which is found the *Arbre Sol*, which we Christians call the *Arbre Sec* . . .; there are no other trees near it nor within 100 miles of it, except on one side where you find trees within about 10 miles distance. And there, the people of the country tell you, was

fought the battle between Alexander and King Darius . . .

Yule places the Tree of the narrative in the vicinity of Bostam or Damgham. Actually, no such battle took place in that region; but, as he points out, we know that Darius, after his defeat, was murdered near Hecatompylos, which appears to have been somewhere near Bostam or Damgham.

In Yule's opinion, Polo was confusing the Dry Tree described, for example, by Mandeville with the fabulous Tree of the Sun (*Arbre Sol*) which figures prominently in all the legendary histories of Alexander. The Naples mosaic, on the contrary, suggests that Polo simply recorded a local and far older tradition. Obviously, the great Tree—an *Arbre Sec* if ever there was one—must have been depicted for a definite reason. Why not as an allusion to a legend—possibly based on fact—that it had witnessed the death, though not the defeat, of the last of the Achaemenidae?

Yours faithfully,

F. S. BURNELL.

Sydney, N.S.W.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

*Excerpts or extracts from periodicals and collections are not included unless they are also published separately.*

- Adrados* (F. R.) *El sistema gentilicio decimal de los indoeuropeos occidentales y los orígenes de Roma.* (Manuales y Anejos de 'Emerita', VII.) Pp. 189. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1948. Paper.
- Adrados* (F. R.) *Estudios sobre el léxico de las fábulas esópicas. En torno a los problemas de la Koiné literaria.* (Theses et Studia Philologica Salamanticensia, II.) Pp. ix+285. Salamanca:

- Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1948. Paper.
- Albenque* (A.) *Inventaire de l'archéologie gallo-romaine du département de l'Aveyron.* Pp. 206; 7 plates, 7 maps and plans. Rodez: Carrère, 1947. Paper, fr. 390.
- Andrew* (S. O.) *Homer's Odyssey translated.* Pp. x+310. London: Dent, 1948. Cloth, 10s. 6d. net.

- Anti* (C.) Guida per il visitatore del teatro antico di Siracusa. Pp. 119; 13 figs. Florence: Sansoni, 1948. Paper, L. 220.
- Archivum Philologicum (Egyetemes Philologiai Közlöny)*. Vols. lxxix (1946), lxxx (1947). Budapest: University of Budapest. Paper.
- Austin* (R. G.) *Quintiliani Institutionis Oratoriae Liber XII*. Pp. xlviii+246. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948. Cloth, 12s. 6d. net.
- Barber* (E.) *The Politics of Aristotle translated with notes*. Pp. xxvii+452. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948. Cloth, 12s. 6d. net.
- Barber* (E.) *Traditions of Civility. Eight Essays*. Pp. viii+370. Cambridge: University Press, 1948. Cloth, 21s. net.
- Biliński* (B.) *De Apollodoreis in Pliniana Graeciae descriptione (N.H. iv. 1-32) obviis*. (Travaux de la Société des Sciences et des Lettres de Wrocław, Série A, No. 7.) Pp. 134. Breslau: Lach, 1948. Paper.
- Biliński* (B.) *Drogi świata starożytnego ku ziemiom słowiańskim w świetle starożytnych świadectw literackich*. (Les voies du monde antique vers les terres slaves à la lumière des témoignages littéraires de l'antiquité.) Pp. 35. Breslau, 1947. Paper.
- Boas* (G.) *Essays on Primitivism and Related Ideas in the Middle Ages*. Pp. xii+227. London: Oxford University Press (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press), 1948. Cloth, 25s. net.
- Bréguet* (E.) *Le Roman de Sulpicia: Élégies IV. 2-12 du 'Corpus Tibullianum'*. Pp. 352. Geneva: Georg, 1946. Paper.
- Carmina Hoeffiana* (1) *Vindemia*; (2) *Patrius Amor*; (3) *Nuntiorum Publicorum Glutinator*; (4) *Mater*. Pp. 8+25+16+15. Amsterdam: Kon. Nederlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen, 1947. Paper.
- Castiglioni* (L.) *L. Annaei Senecae Dialogorum libri IX-X. (Corpus Scriptorum Latinorum Paravianum)*. Pp. xxxvi+77. Turin: Paravia, 1948. Paper, L. 450.
- Dale* (A. M.) *The Lyric Metres of Greek Drama*. Pp. 220. Cambridge: University Press, 1948. Cloth, 18s. net.
- Dawes* (E.) and *Baynes* (N. H.) *Three Byzantine Saints. Contemporary Biographies of St. Daniel the Stylite, St. Theodore of Sykeon and St. John the Almsgiver translated from the Greek*. Pp. xiv+275. Oxford: Blackwell, 1948. Cloth, 21s. net.
- De Jonge* (P.) *Philological and Historical Commentary on Ammianus Marcellinus XV. 1-5. Part III*. Pp. 129. Groningen: Wolters, 1948. Paper, fl. 5.90.
- Delatte* (L.) *Les Traités de la Royauté d'Éphante, Diotogene et Sténéidas*. (Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège, Fasc. XCVII.) Pp. x+318. Liège: Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres (Paris: Droz), 1942. Paper, 100 fr.
- Delatte* (L.) *Textes latins et vieux français relatifs aux Cynarides*. (Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège, Fasc. XCIII.) Pp. x+354. Liège: Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres (Paris: Droz), 1942. Paper, 100 fr.
- Dioniso*. Vol. X, Fasc. 4: Ottobre 1947. Pp. 247-331. Syracuse: Istituto del Dramma Antico. Paper, L. 400 (annual subscription, L. 1,500).
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